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Abstract      
The aging demographic in developed economies makes the funding of pension systems 
a current topic, and the decrease of contribution incomes relative to the pension benefits 
to be paid an inevitability. The prevailing low-interest rate regime increases the present 
values of pension provisions and forces pension funds to undertake riskier and less 
liquid investments. The existing literature on the funding sustainability of the Finnish 
and other earnings-related pension systems makes several suggestions of more or less 
significant overhauls of the systems. However, fewer direct comparisons to practices in 
use in other pension systems are made, or suggestions of quick yet sustainable fixes. 
Significant overhauls to pension systems are slowed down by countries’ respective 
political systems and the passions arising from social partners. Smaller updates could 
be easier and faster to implement while possibly leading to real increases in the 
sustainability of pension systems. 
This thesis compares the Danish, Dutch and Finnish occupational pension systems with 
the aim of making suggestions of updates to improve the long-term financial 
sustainability of the system in Finland. The pension systems in each country are 
described in detail, and the realized and forecast figures are then compared to infer best 
practices. The existing literature is comprehensively reviewed and, against the 
mainstream of the literature, a speculative calculation on the effects of increasing the 
contribution rate in Finland as a means to improve the long-term financial sustainability 
of the pension system is performed. Suggestions and calls for action are made regarding 
six areas: efforts to increase employment; efforts to increase total fertility; cases for 
either decreasing the level of funding of contributions or increasing the contribution 
rate; to compile pension agreements on the sectoral or industry levels; to update and 
limit the solvency capital requirements; and to implement a pension ceiling. 
Keywords      
Pension, retirement, demographics, contribution, benefit, investments, sustainability 
Additional information     
 
3 
 
CONTENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Background and motivation ...................................................................... 6 
1.2 Research gap and methods ........................................................................ 7 
1.3 Structure of the study ................................................................................ 8 
2 COUNTRY DESCRIPTIONS ........................................................................... 9 
2.1 Denmark...................................................................................................... 9 
2.1.1 Retirement age ................................................................................ 10 
2.1.2 Pension scheme funding ................................................................. 10 
2.1.3 Benefit level .................................................................................... 11 
2.1.4 Private vs. public sector pensions ................................................... 12 
2.1.5 Pension fund investment regulation ................................................ 12 
2.1.6 Individual choice in pension saving ................................................ 13 
2.1.7 Mercer Melbourne Global Pension Index 2019 attentions ............. 14 
2.2 Finland ...................................................................................................... 15 
2.2.1 Retirement age ................................................................................ 15 
2.2.2 Pension scheme funding ................................................................. 15 
2.2.3 Benefit level .................................................................................... 16 
2.2.4 Private vs. public sector pensions ................................................... 17 
2.2.5 Pension fund investment regulation ................................................ 18 
2.2.6 Individual choice in pension saving ................................................ 19 
2.2.7 Mercer Melbourne Global Pension Index 2019 attentions ............. 20 
2.3 The Netherlands ....................................................................................... 20 
2.3.1 Retirement age ................................................................................ 21 
4 
 
2.3.2 Pension scheme funding ................................................................. 21 
2.3.3 Benefit level .................................................................................... 22 
2.3.4 Private vs. public sector pensions ................................................... 24 
2.3.5 Pension fund investment regulation ................................................ 24 
2.3.6 Individual choice in pension saving ................................................ 25 
2.3.7 Mercer Melbourne Global Pension Index 2019 attentions ............. 25 
3 COUNTRY COMPARISONS ......................................................................... 27 
3.1 Funding indicators ................................................................................... 27 
3.2 Investments ............................................................................................... 37 
3.3 MMGPI scores .......................................................................................... 44 
4 POLICY DISCUSSION IN FINLAND ........................................................... 49 
4.1 Demographic and economic developments as the basis ........................ 49 
4.2 Investments and funding ......................................................................... 52 
4.3 COVID-19 implications and remedies ................................................... 57 
4.3.1 Finnish pension fund performance.................................................. 62 
4.4 Exercise on increasing the contribution rate ......................................... 63 
4.4.1 Speculation on future contribution rates ......................................... 65 
4.4.2 Contribution rate-hike effects on past data ..................................... 66 
5 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 70 
5.1 Suggestions of updates ............................................................................. 70 
5.2 Limitations and scope for further research ........................................... 74 
6 REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 76 
 
 
5 
 
Figure 1: Relative income position of Dutch pensioners 2012-2017  23 
Figure 2: Earnings-related pension benefits and contributions as a share of GDP in Finland 29 
Figure 3: Occupational pension benefits and contributions as a share of GDP in Denmark 30 
Figure 4: Occupational pension benefits and contributions as a share of GDP in the Netherlands 31 
Figure 5: Admin and investment costs, % of assets in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands 32 
Figure 6: The Finnish, Danish and Dutch employment rates for 15-64-year-olds  33 
Figure 7: ODR, SDR, and the pension system's resistance to demographic change, FIN 34 
Figure 8: ODR, SDR, and the pension system's resistance to demographic change, DNK 34 
Figure 9: ODR, SDR, and the pension system's resistance to demographic change, NLD 35 
Figure 10: The average effective retirement ages, expected retirement age in Finland 36 
Figure 11: The Finnish and Danish average pensions to average earnings  37 
Figure 12: 2008-2018 annual real returns of the Danish and Dutch OP systems and of the 38 
Finnish private and public sector ERP funds 
Figure 13: Finnish pension asset allocation 1999-2019   40 
Figure 14: Pension asset allocation for Danish life-insurance and pension companies 2005-2018 40 
Figure 15: Pension assets of Danish life-insurance and pension companies 2005-2018 41 
Figure 16: Dutch pension asset allocation 2006-2019   42 
Figure 17: Earnings-related pension income and expenses, € m   51 
Figure 18: TyEL and JuEL nominal investment returns   53 
Figure 19: ICE BofA BBB US Corporate Index Option-Adjusted Spread  58 
Figure 20: Trade weighted US Dollar index: Emerging Market economies, goods and services 59 
 
Table 1: Pension liabilities to GDP and assets to pension liabilities  28 
Table 2: The 2018 gross and net pension replacement rates at different income levels 36 
Table 3: 2008-2018 average annual and cumulative real returns of the Danish and Dutch 38 
OP systems and the Finnish private and public sector ERP funds 
Table 4: Company specific average annual returns, 2010-2019   39 
Table 5: Allocations of the largest pension funds in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands 43 
Table 6: The funding ratios of the largest Danish and Dutch pension funds and the solvency 44 
rate of the Finnish TyEL funds 
Table 7: Adequacy sub-index indicators    46 
Table 8: Sustainability sub-index indicators    47 
Table 9: Net investment returns and assets    62 
Table 10: The basic and risk-adjusted investment allocations at market values  63 
Table 11: The basic pattern of pension asset development 2020-2065 vs. a speculative 65 
case with an initially higher contribution rate; 2019 prices 
Table 12: Basic and speculative case pension assets as a share of GDP  66 
Table 13: The realized development of pension assets and payments 2007-2019 vs. 67 
a speculative case with 1 %-point higher contributions 
Table 14: The realized and speculative cumulative contributions, payments, investment 68 
returns and end-of-period assets for 2007-2019 
Table 15: Realized and speculative contribution levels, effect on median salary-net income  69
 
6 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Pension systems throughout developed economies are facing long-term financing 
challenges due to aging populations (Gruber et al., 2019; Ilmarinen, 2020). Poutiainen 
& Tenhunen (2020) assert the current level of contribution income in Finland will not 
suffice to pay pension benefits in the current fashion in the future. The increasing life-
expectancy and low total fertility mean that future generations are smaller than their 
elders. In the partly funded, defined benefit (DB) Finnish pension system, where most 
of the annual pension benefits are paid with incoming contributions, this directly 
weakens the earnings-related pension (ERP) system’s financing outlook as the 
incoming contributions diminish relative to the paid benefits (ibid.). The sustainability 
of the Finnish ERP system is based on three assumptions: i) balanced demographic 
development and a sustainable dependency ratio; ii) solid economic growth, 
productivity, and high employment; iii) reasonable investment returns. All three 
assumptions have been under stress since the Financial Crisis (Aaltonen et al., 2017). 
The financial sustainability of the ERP system is thus a current societal issue in Finland 
and affects everyone in the population. The concept holds within the levels of 
contribution income and benefit payments, the investment returns and the expenses in 
the system, and as a result the level of pension assets, but also demographic and 
employment developments. A broader interest in the pension system among the 
population would be beneficial to stimulate societal discussion and to incentivize 
policymakers to act. This thesis aims to compile current studies and discussion entries 
between the same covers and to make suggestions of applicable updates to the ERP 
system. The information is beneficial in giving an up-to-date picture of the state of the 
ERP system in Finland and thus enabling and encouraging better informed discussion. 
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1.2 Research gap and methods 
The aim is to find methods additional to the ones most often discussed in the Finnish 
literature, to base suggestions for improving the financial sustainability of the Finnish 
ERP system on such findings, and thus expand the discussion in Finland. Literature 
provides multitudes of estimates and recommendations on courses of action, but few 
direct comparisons between practices in different pension systems. This thesis studies 
the occupational pension (OP) systems in Denmark and the Netherlands and through 
comparison with the Finnish ERP system makes suggestions of practices to adopt in 
Finland. While there are suggestions of more thorough overhauls of the funding 
construction of the system, e.g. Aaltonen et al. (2017), this thesis does not study or 
indeed suggest making significant changes to the level of funding or the accrual or 
payment of benefits. The partly funded ERP system is primarily funded by each 
generation in turn paying the accrued benefits of those on retirement, while accruing 
their own benefits (ibid.). This intergenerational agreement is one of the Finnish ERP 
system’s cornerstones and accordingly the research question is: how to update the 
Finnish ERP system to improve long-term financial sustainability while supporting 
intergenerational equality, based on practices in Denmark and the Netherlands? 
The research is predominantly qualitative in nature, although quantitative comparisons 
between the pension systems in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands are made. A 
quantitative, yet speculative, exercise on the possible magnitude of effects of 
increasing the contribution rate in Finland is also conducted. The purpose of the 
exercise is to infer the likely range of benefits for the pension system, and to gain an 
understanding of the broader economic effects from raising the contribution rate. 
Literature from Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands is comprehensively reviewed 
to gain an understanding of the functioning of the pension systems and related 
forecasts, and the surrounding demographic and employment developments. Statistics 
about the realized performance in the pension systems are extensively used, as are 
forecasts made by official institutions, associations of pension insurers and 
consultancies. The utilized material gives a look into the past, present and future of the 
pension systems and enables answering the research question. 
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The primary method will be a country-comparison between Denmark, Finland, and the 
Netherlands. Denmark and the Netherlands have been chosen due to their constant 
ranking as first and second, in alternating order, in international indices. The 
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (MMGPI) is the most referenced index and 
the 2019 edition ranked the Netherlands as first, Denmark second and Finland fourth 
(MMGPI, 2019). The Danish and Dutch OP systems are fully funded as opposed to 
partly funded in Finland, and while the Dutch system is predominantly of the defined 
benefit type like in Finland, the Danish system is predominantly of the defined 
contribution (DC) type. Thus, there are one and two existential differences between 
the Finnish and the Dutch and Danish ERP systems, respectively. This thesis seeks to 
identify practices in use in Denmark and the Netherlands, and as suggested in the 
literature, that could be applied in the Finnish ERP system to improve financial 
sustainability. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
In order to answer the research question, how to update the Finnish ERP system to 
improve long-term financial sustainability while supporting intergenerational equality, 
based on practices in Denmark and the Netherlands, an understanding of the state of 
the pension systems must be obtained. With knowledge of the pension systems’ 
workings, the facts and figures of the systems can be compared to each other to infer 
the effects of different practices. Proceeding, the discussion around the financial 
sustainability of the ERP system in Finland is reviewed to learn of the updates already 
suggested and of related analyses. A speculative calculation is also made on the effects 
of increasing the contribution rate in Finland. Finally, suggestions of practices to adopt 
in the ERP system are made. 
The thesis proceeds by presenting country descriptions in chapter 2, performing 
comparisons of country data in chapter 3, reviewing the state of the discussion in 
Finland and performing an exercise on the effects of raising the contribution rate in 
chapter 4, and concludes in chapter 5. 
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2 COUNTRY DESCRIPTIONS 
The characteristics of the OP systems in Denmark and the Netherlands and the ERP 
system in Finland will be discussed here. Note that the focus is specifically on the 
employees’ pension systems and not on e.g. pensions for entrepreneurs. The retirement 
age, pension system funding, benefit level, differences between private and public 
sector pensions, applicable investment regulation, personal choice in pension saving 
and MMGPI (2019) attentions are discussed regarding each system. Following the 
country descriptions in chapter 2, chapter 3 will then compare funding and investment 
related data and indicators in more detail. 
2.1 Denmark 
The Danish pension system is a three-pillar system like in the Netherlands, set up with 
the aim of preventing old-age poverty. The base is the public folkepension, which is a 
tax-financed, universal old-age pension. The size of the folkepension benefit depends 
on the time a person has lived in Denmark. Until 1 July 2025, to qualify for the full 
folkepension, a person must have lived in Denmark for 40 years, while thereafter 9/10 
years of residence between the age of 15 and the public retirement age is required 
(OECD, 2019a). In 1964, Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension (ATP) was founded to 
provide a supplementary pension to employees. Membership is voluntary for the self-
employed (ATP, 2020). The fully funded ATP belongs in the 1st pillar as well, although 
it is financed by employees and employers – it is a statutory part of social security in 
Denmark, with one third of contributions paid by employees and two thirds by 
employers. The fully funded 2nd pillar OP system was set up in 1987 by social partners 
and is considered a supplementary pension to the statutory schemes. The OP system is 
set up at the sectoral level, although company specific pension schemes do exist. The 
3rd pillar consists of private, voluntary pension arrangements through banks and 
insurance companies (Jensen et al., 2019a). The focus in this paper will be on the 2nd 
pillar OP system and somewhat on ATP. 
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2.1.1 Retirement age 
The 1st and 2nd pillar pensions have separate retirement ages. In 2020, the 1st pillar 
retirement age is 67 years. The public retirement age will be bound to life expectancy 
beginning in 2031. An individual may postpone starting the public pension and 
continue in employment, conditional on the individual earning income on at least 750 
working hours in a calendar year. The postponement may be done twice for a 
maximum of 10 years. The final benefits will be larger if the starting date is postponed 
(OECD, 2019a). The 2nd pillar retirement age is 67 years (FCP, 2020a). 
2.1.2 Pension scheme funding 
The ATP Lifelong Pension has a fixed, uniform contribution based on hours worked 
by the employee. The final contribution is the maximum DKK 3 408 per year for most 
Danish employed people (ATP, 2020). OECD (2019b) reports the second pillar 
contribution rates at 12-18 %, depending on the sector. Jensen et al. (2019a) report the 
contribution rate for the construction, service, transportation, consumer goods and 
industry sectors to be 12 %, and 13 % for agriculture. Jensen et al. (ibid.) assert that 
sectors with similar health factors and life expectancy are bound together in the Danish 
OP system in order to limit transfers from occupational groups with shorter life 
expectancy to those with longer life expectancy and better health. 
Pension providers are not bound by joint liability like in Finland and returns on pension 
assets directly impact individual pension savings under the second pillar OP system 
(Jensen et al., 2019b). The second-pillar sectoral OP schemes are predominantly of the 
DC-type, with 95 % being DC and 5 % being of the DB-type. Like in the first pillar 
ATP, the employee pays 1/3 of the contribution in the second pillar pension scheme 
and the employer pays 2/3 (Chen & Beetsma, 2015). There are no separate social 
security payments in Denmark like in the Netherlands, where there is a specific 
payment related to AOW and health care. Instead, the public first pillar pensions are 
financed from general tax income (OECD, 2019a). 
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2.1.3 Benefit level 
Public pension income is means-tested against all personal income, including the ATP 
and OP schemes. The basic amount, DKK 6 327 per month, is reduced at a rate of 30 
% for income earned exceeding DKK 336 900 per year. The pension supplement is 
reduced at a rate of 30,9 % for single pensioners for income exceeding DKK 74 400 
per year, and at 16 or 32 % for cohabiting or married pensioners for combined income 
exceeding DKK 149 100, depending on whether both receive social pension or not, 
respectively (OECD, 2019a; Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2020). The public pension 
benefit level is adjusted annually based on two-year wage developments two years 
before the current fiscal year, e.g. the 2020 adjustment is based on 2017-18 wage 
developments (EC, 2018). 
The maximum ATP pension is DKK 24 500 per year if an individual has been paying 
contributions throughout their working life, however the average ATP pension is DKK 
16 400 per year (ATP, 2020). ATP also functions as life insurance and is the most 
common such product in Denmark. The policy provides surviving children under the 
age of 21 a lump sum of DKK 50 000 and a widow or partner DKK 75 000, if the 
deceased has paid ATP contributions for at least two years. The paid amount decreases 
by DKK 15 000 for every year the policyholder grows older after reaching the state 
retirement age (ibid.). 
The second pillar OP benefits depend on the type of scheme the individual has – 
average rate or market rate scheme. In the former, benefits are based on average returns 
on pension savings, which are maintained with payments from the pension fund’s 
bonus potential during downturns, and again in upswings the bonus potential is built 
up with excess returns. In the latter, the policyholder directly bears the investment risk. 
The share of market rate schemes is increasing, and in December 2019, 64 % of OP 
schemes remained average rate schemes (DKNB, 2019). Returns on pension savings 
are taxed at a rate of 15,3 % (OECD, 2019a). Jensen et al. (2019a) estimate the net 
replacement rates to range from approximately 118 % for the lowest-earning income 
decile to approximately 50 % for the highest-earning decile in 2025. The replacement 
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rates for all income deciles are estimated to increase by 10-20 percentage points by 
2080 as the OP system reaches maturity, meaning its assets increase (ibid.). 
2.1.4 Private vs. public sector pensions 
There is a distinction between public and private sector pensions in Denmark. Public 
sector employees have been, and some still are, enrolled in a DB-type pension scheme, 
where the final replacement rate is up to 57 % of the final employment year’s pay, if 
the worker has been a public sector employee for 37 years. However, few new public 
sector employees are included in the DB-scheme and are instead enrolled in a public 
employee-specific DC-type scheme similarly to the OP system. In 2016 there were 
165 000 DB-type civil servant pension recipients, while it is estimated there will be 1 
000 left in 2060 (EC, 2018). All public sector employees are enrolled in an OP scheme 
(OECD, 2019a). 
2.1.5 Pension fund investment regulation 
Very few limitations exist regarding asset allocation for Danish insurance and pension 
funds. OECD (2019c) reports that there are no asset allocation limits in effect, besides 
the Solvency II Prudent Person Principle for larger pension funds and life insurance 
providers and the Directive on the Activities and Prudential Supervision of 
Institutional Occupational Retirement Provisions (IORP2) Prudent Person Principle 
for small, single company pension funds. The Solvency II Prudent Person Principle 
stipulates that insurers invest only in assets whose risk profiles they can fully measure, 
monitor and take into account in their solvency needs, and that all assets must be 
invested in a manner that secures the liquidity and profitability of the portfolio. The 
IORP2 Prudent Person Principle is essentially similar to that in Solvency II, just the 
directive is specific to smaller actors (BaFin, 2020). 
Danmarks Nationalbank (DKNB) (2019) reports that at the end of 2019Q3, insurance 
and pension companies had invested 43,8 % of their assets in bonds directly and 56,3 
% indirectly, when investment funds and their investments into bonds are considered. 
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DKNB (ibid.) also reports that approximately 70 % the sector’s U$D exposure is 
hedged, although the rate has been declining. The reason for the hedging rate is that 
insurance and pension companies have products with guaranteed returns, e.g. average 
rate pension schemes, that the companies must be able to pay in the future. Especially 
ATP uses hedging extensively – 80 % of the contributions paid to ATP are applied to 
such guaranteed pensions and hedged. Due to the high amount of ATP savings invested 
in relatively low-risk fixed-return assets, savers are seeing a negative rate of return 
after inflation. ATP has suggested the Minister of Employment to update its business 
model, to allow investing up to 40 % of savings in a return-seeking manner and leaving 
60 % of savings to be hedged with a guaranteed yield (IPE, 2020). 
Finanstilsynet (2017) notes that the on-going low-interest rate regime and increasing 
life expectancies have put pressure on guaranteed pension products, leading to the 
increased use of non-guaranteed products, i.e. market rate pensions. Pension 
companies have a solvency capital requirement obliging the company to meet 
obligations to policyholders over the next 12 months with a 99,5 % minimum 
probability. A pension company that has more guaranteed pension products bears 
greater risks related to meeting its obligations and thus needs more solvency capital. 
Such pension companies also generally invest less in equities. Asset allocation into 
equity after 2016Q2 was on average 22 % of average return product assets, while it 
was on average 37 % of market return product assets (ibid.). Finanstilsynet (2019) 
acknowledges the tough spot pension companies face, but also warns policyholders 
against switching to market rate products in hopes of greater returns without due 
consideration of the risks and market conditions, and possible net negative returns. 
2.1.6 Individual choice in pension saving 
Finanstilsynet (2017) reports it is common that pension providers offer clients a choice 
over the risk profile, i.e. the predictability and stability, of the pension product they are 
purchasing. In Denmark, the OP pension schemes are of the DC-type and individuals 
and generations are thus responsible for their own savings without intergenerational 
transfers. The OECD (2019a) reports that pension benefits are usually lifelong 
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annuities, but benefits may be front-loaded in the early phase of retirement or 
withdrawn as a lump sum. Jensen et al. (2019b) reports that approximately half of 
policyholders take the lump sum payment. Pension savings may be withdrawn early 
in Denmark, though the savings are then subject to a 60 % tax (DCTA, 2020). 
The Danish OP system is the result of collective bargaining and many sectors have 
collective agreements dictating an employer’s pension provider and scheme. The 
collective pension arrangements are set up around occupational groups with a similar 
health outlook and life expectancy to avoid redistribution between groups. If a 
company is not covered under such a collective agreement, they are free to choose 
their pension provider and scheme. Participation in the OP system is compulsory for 
employees and employers (OECD, 2019a; Jensen et al., 2019a). The collective nature 
of pension schemes helps bring the operating costs of the pension system down: Jensen 
et al. (2019b) reports the operating costs of the Danish occupational pension system at 
0,2 % of assets, versus 0,5 % in Finland. Everyone contributes to the first pillar 
folkepension through taxes and to ATP (Jensen, 2018). 
2.1.7 Mercer Melbourne Global Pension Index 2019 attentions 
MMGPI (2019) ranks Denmark on the second place of the 2019 Pension Index with 
80,3 points, up from 80,2 a year earlier. Denmark has held first or second place in the 
index for years. MMGPI (ibid.) raises the issue of household indebtedness and urges 
countries to beware overt debt-raising, as future pension benefits may prove 
inadequate in relation to high levels of debt. Denmark is shown to have pension assets 
worth approximately 210 % of GDP, while net household debt is approximately 125 
%. To improve the Danish pension system, MMGPI recommends Denmark increases 
the level of household saving and reduces household debt; improves the protection of 
pension benefits of parties in a divorce; and increases the labor force participation rate 
among the older population. Denmark took first place in the Sustainability category in 
2019, 4th in Adequacy and 8th in Integrity. Adequacy accounts for 40 % of the overall 
mark, Sustainability for 35 % and Integrity 25 % (ibid.). 
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2.2 Finland 
The DB-type ERP scheme started to develop in the 1960s, aiming to guarantee 
adequate income in old age and unemployment (TELA, 2020). The system is governed 
by the employee’s pension law (työntekijän eläkelaki, TyEL), while entrepreneurs 
(yrittäjien eläkelaki, YEL), farmers (maatalousyrittäjien eläkelaki, MYEL), mariners 
(merimieseläkelaki) and public sector employees (julkisten alojen eläkelaki, JuEL) 
have their own legal frameworks. The systems are similar except for the entrepreneurs’ 
pension system, which is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) arrangement. The main focus is on 
the TyEL and JuEL ERP systems. 
2.2.1 Retirement age 
The lowest retirement age in the employees’ pension system is 63 years for people 
born in 1954 or earlier with the age limit rising per cohort until for those born in 1965 
and later the age limit is tied to life expectancy. The highest pension insurance age is 
68 – 70 years depending on the birth cohort. Most apply to start their pension at the 
minimum allowed age (Barr, 2013). It is also possible to apply for a partial old-age 
pension as a part of the ERP system, allowing the retiree to receive 25 or 50 % of their 
accrued pension benefits and to continue working simultaneously. The minimum age 
for the partial old-age pension is cohort dependent, but in general it is three years 
before the minimum retirement age. The partial old-age pension is reduced by 0,4 % 
for every month by which the retiree is younger than their cohort’s minimum 
retirement age, and the benefit is life expectancy-tested. The retiree may continue in 
employment while receiving the partial old-age benefit (FCP, 2017). 
2.2.2 Pension scheme funding 
The Finnish employees’ ERP scheme is a DB system, where pension benefits are based 
on salary history, and individual pensions are unaffected by investment returns. The 
employer and the employee, both funding the employee’s future pension, know the 
future level of the pension at the time of paying the contributions. In private sector 
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pensions, 5/6 of the annual contribution income is used to pay out current pensions 
and 1/6 is funded. Approximately 1/4 of annually paid pension benefits are covered 
with the accrued pension funds, while 3/4 are covered with contribution income 
directly. Investment returns then top up the pension funds. The funds’ purpose is to 
ease the pressure to raise contribution rates as the population grows older and living 
expenses increase (TELA, 2020). 
2.2.3 Benefit level 
The annual contribution to the retirement scheme is 24,4 % of an employee’s gross 
annual retirement scheme insured income, of which employees aged 18 – 52 and 63 – 
68 pay 7,15 % and those aged 53 – 62 pay 8,65 %, while the employer pays the rest. 
The higher personal contribution for those aged 53 – 62 is due to the idea that at the 
later stages of a career, the employee is likely to earn more, and thus can contribute 
more. 1,5 % of an employee’s annual retirement scheme insured income increases the 
employee’s future pension. At 53-62 years of age the employee’s pension increases by 
1,7 % of the annual income until 2025, when the transition period following the 2017 
pension reform ends. After the minimum age cohort-specific pension age, every 
additional month the employee continues working increases their future pension 
benefits by 0,4 % per month (FCP, 2020a; TELA, 2020). 
In addition to the ERP scheme, there are two public, tax-paid pension schemes that act 
as social insurance: the national and guarantee pensions. In case monthly earnings-
related pension income is €56,04 or below, a person can receive the full monthly 
national pension, €662,86, or €591,79 if the person is married or cohabits. A person is 
eligible to receive guarantee pension when their pension income is below €827,78. The 
guarantee pension is paid by KELA on top of other pension income to form a total 
monthly pension income of €834,52. In case a person has retired at an earlier age than 
the system calls for and started to withdraw their pension, the level of the guarantee 
pension is lower (FCP, 2020a). 
 
17 
 
2.2.4 Private vs. public sector pensions 
The retirement system is split into different frameworks legislatively. Both the private 
and public sector employee’s pension systems, TyEL and JuEL respectively, are of the 
defined benefit-type. JuEL has had special conditions regarding retirement age, 
pension contributions and increases in the level of future pensions, however today the 
benefit accrual is similar as in the private sector TyEL. The JuEL pensions are 
administered by Keva, formerly Kuntien eläkevakuutus, which is a public institution. 
Keva is the largest pension provider with assets over €56 bn at year-end 2019 (KEVA, 
2020). The State Pension Fund of Finland (VER) invests and administers the general 
government employees’ pension assets. VER does not administer pension benefits or 
rights, instead it is a buffer fund and Keva administers all public sector pensions 
benefits. As a buffer fund, VER is exempted from the solvency requirements that bind 
private sector pension companies. Keva is also exempted as it is not bound by the joint 
liability for pension assets like the private sector companies are (TELA, 2020). 
The private sector TyEL has four private sector pension companies: Elo, Ilmarinen, 
Varma and Veritas. Ilmarinen and Varma are the largest, with €46,4 bn and €43,6 bn 
in assets, respectively, after 2020Q1 (TELA, 2020). Additionally, there are some 
company-specific and industry-wide pension funds and trusts, which together 
administer pensions for approximately 2 % of all the ERP insured. The number of 
company-specific and industry-wide funds and trusts has decreased significantly in the 
2000s (FCP, 2020a). At the end of 2019, the Finnish occupational pension scheme 
providers, private and public combined, had €215 bn worth of investment assets under 
management. The private sector funds had €135 bn altogether, while the public sector 
funds had €81 bn (ibid.). After 2020Q1, the four private sector pension companies’ 
assets had declined from €128 bn to €116 bn while public sector assets were at €68 bn 
(ibid.). At the end of 2019, all pension investment assets in Finland amounted to 89,7 
% of GDP (ibid.). 
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2.2.5 Pension fund investment regulation 
The private pension funds’ investment allocation possibilities are limited with capital 
requirements. A pension provider assesses the risks stemming from its investment 
allocation for the next year and it has to be able to cover 97 % of that sum should its 
risks realize, which is the solvency capital requirement (FCP, 2020a). Stock allocation 
is limited to a maximum of 65 % of assets by law, but in practice direct stock 
allocations have varied between 30 – 45 % of assets for the private pension providers 
after the 2008 financial crisis. The allocation has been approximately 10 %-points 
higher for public pension providers (FINLEX, 2020; Rantala, 2020). 
The private pension funds face a deviation risk related to the solvency capital 
requirement and a fund transfer obligation. Based on the average private sector pension 
provider investment returns, a single pension fund must pay into their pension asset 
fund from their investment returns. In case the single pension provider achieves below-
average returns, the missing part has to be paid into their funded assets from their 
solvency capital. This decreases the pension provider’s solvency capital, thus 
decreasing their ability to take investment risk, and calls for achieving above-average 
future period returns to fill in their solvency capital again. Lower solvency capital also 
results in a decreased ability to pay client bonuses (Rantala, 2020). 
The purpose of the deviation risk mechanism is to incentivize private sector pension 
providers to strive for higher returns and to ensure the adequacy of pension liabilities. 
A side-effect is that the pension funds’ investments have become homogenous. The 
investment return correlations of the private sector pension providers are between 0,94 
– 1,00, suggesting there are few actual diversification benefits stemming from 
competition between the pension providers, which was originally an objective in 
having multiple private sector pension companies (Aaltonen et al., 2017). 
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2.2.6 Individual choice in pension saving 
An individual has no choice over their pension provider or the pension provider’s 
investments. The employer chooses the pension provider, or the provider is 
automatically a public pension provider in case of a public sector employer. Originally, 
the employer paid the entire pension contribution and it was a regular business for 
pension providers to loan back funded components from an employer’s pension 
contributions to the employer. The private sector pension providers compete with 
investment returns, which are visible to clients in the form of client bonuses, but an 
individual saver has no choice over the pension provider, investment profile or the 
level or timing of pension contributions, which could lead to the individual becoming 
indebted (Jensen, 2019b). 
Regulation regarding pension providers is set in the Finnish Law and is enforced by 
the Finnish Financial Authority (FIN-FSA). The investment allocations available to 
pension providers are restricted by law because the earnings-related pension scheme 
is a law-mandated part of social security in Finland and the pension providers are 
bound by joint liability. Joint liability means that outstanding pensions will be paid 
also in the case a pension provider would go bankrupt – the other pension providers 
will then take on those pension liabilities (FCP, 2020a). 
The ERP scheme has limited individual choice over saving, which Barr (2013) argues 
is supported by behavioral economics. Barr (ibid.) argues an individual could make 
unfavorable consumption choices future-wise, opting to consume more at an earlier 
stage in life and become ill-equipped to support themselves later. Furthermore, an 
individual may be uninterested or incapable of figuring out optimal pension saving, 
and individual choice could increase systemic costs due to controlling for adequate 
individual saving efforts and the operations of additional pension providers (ibid.). 
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2.2.7 Mercer Melbourne Global Pension Index 2019 attentions 
MMGPI (2019) recommends Finland to increase minimum pension benefits, to 
increase the level of pension contributions, to improve individual pension security in 
case of a divorce and to improve the employment rate among older workers. Finland 
fell from fourth to third place in 2019 due to changes in calculation conventions 
(MMGPI, 2019; FCP, 2020a). Finland received the top score in the Integrity 
assessment area, while being ranked 7th in Adequacy and 10th in Sustainability. 
Adequacy makes up 40 % of the mark, Sustainability 35 %, and Integrity 25 %. 
MMGPI (2019) notes that household debt increases by $ 0,466 for a $ 1 increase in 
pension assets. The report argues that as future income is better secured, i.e. future 
pension income becomes more secure, households feel more comfortable increasing 
indebtedness. The report does not name Finland in particular but urges for caution in 
avoiding overt household indebtedness (ibid.). 
2.3 The Netherlands 
The Dutch pension system is a three-pillar system. The first pillar is the Algemene 
Ouderdomswet (AOW) act set up in 1957, which is a pay-as-you-go and partially tax-
financed state pension aiming to prevent old-age poverty. The second pillar is 
occupational pensions, in which over 90 % of Dutch employees participate. The 
second pillar pensions schemes are mostly of the DB type and are fully funded. The 
second pillar is split into three types of pension funds: industry-wide pension funds 
mandated by law, company-specific pension funds, and pension funds for employees 
in particular professions. The third pillar consists of individual schemes, which is 
mostly for those not covered under the second pillar (Jensen et al., 2019b; Pensioen 
Federatie, 2020). The focus here is on the second pillar pensions, comparable to the 
Finnish ERP scheme, though the Finnish scheme is a first-pillar scheme as it is a law-
mandated part of social security. 
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2.3.1 Retirement age 
The target retirement age in the Netherlands is 68 years. Earlier or later retirement is 
possible, whence the pension benefit will be recalculated to be lower for early starters 
and higher for those working longer. The maximum retirement age is five years from 
the date of turning 68. It is possible to postpone starting the retirement and not work 
during the period. The minimum age for the AOW was increased to 66 years 4 months 
on 1.1.2019, and will further be increased to 67 years in 2024 and be linked to life 
expectancy thereafter (Belastingsdienst, 2020; Pensioen Federatie, 2020). 
2.3.2 Pension scheme funding 
Most of the Dutch second-pillar pension schemes are of the DB-type. However, 
pension funds are also approximately fully funded, and the annuities are variable based 
on a pension fund’s investment strategy, which are DC scheme characteristics (Jensen 
et al., 2019b; IMF, 2019). In case a second-pillar pension fund faces problems, all fund 
stakeholders share the costs. Possible measures to remedy a pension fund’s capital 
shortage are raising contributions, increasing the employer’s wage costs and 
decreasing the employee’s net wage, limiting the index-linked increasing of benefits, 
and in extreme cases cutting pension benefits to fix the coverage ratio of a fund. Most 
Dutch pension funds have not indexed benefits since the 2008-09 crisis. Between 
2010-2019 the Dutch pension assets grew from €701 bn to €1561 bn. The number of 
pension funds in the Netherlands is currently 214 (DNB, 2020a; DNB, 2020b; 
Pensioen Federatie, 2020). The 2019 Dutch GDP was €810 bn which means that the 
Dutch pension assets were approximately 193 % of GDP at the end of 2019 (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2020a). 
DC-type pension schemes are rising in popularity, as the costs are easily calculable 
and low. The IFRS accounting standard and the low interest rate environment have 
precipitated the development. In a DC-scheme the individual pays a contribution and 
receives a benefit depending on the returns to their contributions. The individual bears 
the investment and interest rate risks, and the final benefit may be considerably lower 
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than originally estimated. Individual DC-pension schemes are rare. From the 
perspective of international accounting standards, most Dutch pension schemes are 
seeing as being of the DC-type, because pension liabilities must be fully funded, 
though the schemes pay an annuity and are otherwise organized as DB-schemes. There 
are also hybrid Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) schemes, where the benefit is 
based on income and employment years like in DB-schemes, but the contribution is 
fixed for years at a time like in DC-schemes. If the contribution turns out to have been 
too low to afford the planned benefit level, the final benefit will be lower than planned 
(Pensioen Federatie, 2020). 
The industry-wide pension schemes have the most participants, with three quarters of 
Dutch employees covered by such schemes. In the second pillar schemes the average 
contribution rate is 24 % of an employee’s pension insured earnings – on average the 
employer pays 17 % and the employee 7 % (Karpowicz, 2019). Everyone pays the 
contribution, and everyone accrues their pension benefit by a similar amount for the 
paid contribution. The 2019 pension reform introduces a change where an older 
employee receives a smaller accrual in their benefits per contribution, as their paid 
contributions have less time to accrue returns before retirement (EC, 2019). When 
changing jobs, an employee can choose whether to move their accrued benefits to a 
pension fund associated with the new employer or to keep the benefits in the previous 
pension fund. If the previous pension fund’s coverage ratio is below 100 %, the 
accrued benefits cannot be moved to another pension fund (Pensioen Federatie, 2020). 
2.3.3 Benefit level 
Pension contributions are paid from the gross salary including benefits, after deducting 
the AOW payment share. In an average income pension scheme, a maximum of 1,875 
% of annual income is accruing the pension insured’s future benefit. In a final income 
scheme, a maximum of 1,657 % of annual income is accruing the future benefit. The 
average income pension scheme means that after paying pension contributions for 40 
years, the pension insured will receive a maximum of 75 % of their average working 
life salary as pension benefits. The highest annual income considered for pension 
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insurance in second-pillar schemes has been €110 111 since 1 January 2020. Any 
income above this amount can be pension insured by the individual if so desired in a 
third-pillar scheme or be saved as a net-pension: save an annuity of the above-
maximum share with a similar 1,875 % maximum contribution rate. When saving a 
net-pension, the resulting future pension annuities are tax-free as income tax has 
already been paid from the salary (Belastingsdienst, 2020). Eurostat (2020) reports the 
aggregate pension replacement rate in the Netherlands at 52 % in 2019. 
 
Figure 1: Relative income position of Dutch pensioners 2012-2017 (Statistics Netherlands, 
2019). 
Figure 1 shows the relative income position of pensioners in the Netherlands weakened 
between 2012-2017. It shows that those with low income maintained their position on 
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the income ladder, while those with higher income saw a decline in their purchasing 
power (Statistics Netherlands, 2019). Those higher up the income ladder receive a 
greater share of their income from occupational pension schemes, which mostly have 
not been index-raised since the 2008 crisis, resulting in the group’s relative income 
position weakening. 
2.3.4 Private vs. public sector pensions 
The Dutch public sector employees’ pensions are administered by specific pension 
funds, but the pension schemes overall are similar to those in the private sector 
(Palacios & Whitehouse, 2006). The government and education sector employees’ 
pension fund ABP is the biggest in the Netherlands with €459 bn in pension assets and 
€518 bn in liabilities, and a coverage ratio of 88,7 % as of February 29 2020 (ABP, 
2020). 
2.3.5 Pension fund investment regulation 
There are no specific limits to asset allocation for Dutch pension funds, like the 65 % 
upper limit to equity allocation in Finland (OECD, 2019c). The funding position of 
pension funds is controlled, however. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) supervises the 
pension funds’ funding ratio – the ratio of a fund’s pension assets to its pension 
liabilities. The funding ratio is an indicator of the fund’s health and dictates whether 
the fund can make index-linked increases to pension benefits or not, and if the fund 
must remedy its position by e.g. raising contribution rates or cutting benefits. If the 
funding ratio is 110 % or greater, the fund can apply index-linking; if the funding ratio 
is 104 – 110 %, index-linking is ceased; and if the ratio falls below 104 %, the fund 
will eventually have to take measures. If a pension fund fails to meet its minimum own 
funds-requirement for five consecutive years, or its funding ratio falls below the fund-
specific critical lower limit, the fund will have to raise contributions and in extreme 
cases cut pension benefits (DNB, 2020b). After 2019Q2, 51 pension funds that 
together administer 60 % of all Dutch pension rights had coverage ratios below 104 
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%, while 53 funds responsible for another 20 % of all pension rights were between 104 
– 110 %, and were thus unable to apply pension indexation (DNB, 2020b). 
2.3.6 Individual choice in pension saving 
The individual has limited choice over pension savings and how they are invested in 
the second-pillar pension schemes (van Dalen & Henkens, 2018). In principle, it is not 
mandatory for the individual to participate in a pension scheme, but many employers 
are required to provide a pension arrangement for their employees. Participation in 
such provided schemes is made mandatory under Small Mandatory Participation, 
leading to more than 90 % of all Dutch employees participating in the second-pillar 
occupational pension system. Large Mandatory Participation compels employers to 
offer a pension scheme. Due to the combination of Small and Large Mandatory 
Participation, over 75 % of Dutch employees participate in a sectoral pension scheme. 
The mandatory participation of employers in sectoral pension schemes is argued with 
preventing employers from competing based on their pension arrangement. However, 
an employer may be exempted from participating in a sectoral pension fund e.g. if the 
fund has underperformed for the past five years (Chen & Beetsma, 2015). 
Karpowicz (2019) defends the easier ensuring of the system’s sustainability, limiting 
the effects of the participants’ cognitive biases and financial illiteracy, the participants’ 
stronger bargaining power in the markets, and the pooling of longevity and systemic 
macro risks resulting from the mandatory, collective pension schemes. As the mass of 
pension assets is administered by sectoral pension funds and multiple employers 
participate in the same schemes, the operating costs are also low compared to a pension 
system with employer-specific pension schemes: Jensen et al. (2019b) reports 
operating costs in the Netherlands at 0,1 % of assets vs. 0,5 % in Finland. 
2.3.7 Mercer Melbourne Global Pension Index 2019 attentions 
The Dutch pension system was again ranked first in the MMGPI (2019) with 81,0 
points. The Netherlands’ points rose from 80,3 to 81,0 due to changes in calculation 
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conventions regarding net pension benefits and increases in household net savings. 
Household indebtedness has been decreasing since its 2010Q3 peak of 119,6 % of 
GDP to 100,9 % after 2019Q3 (ECB, 2020). The Netherlands is recommended to 
further decrease household indebtedness and to increase the employment rate for older 
generations as life-expectancy continues to grow. MMGPI (2019) asserts that a higher 
level of pension assets predicts a higher level of household indebtedness, as 
households feel more comfortable taking on debt as future income is better secured. 
The Netherlands was ranked third in Adequacy with 78,5 points, second in 
Sustainability with 78,3 points, and third in Integrity with 88,8 points (ibid.). 
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3 COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
This chapter will compare the funding indicators of Denmark, Finland, and the 
Netherlands. The indicators’ implications will then be discussed to gain an 
understanding of the positives and negatives of the pension systems. The first section 
handles funding data: the level of funded pension liabilities, pension benefits in 
relation to contribution income and GDP, administration costs, employment data, 
retirement ages, and mean pensions. The second section covers investment returns, 
allocations and funding ratios. Section three compares the attentions and update 
suggestions made in MMGPI (2019) regarding each pension system. 
3.1 Funding indicators 
Table 1 presents the pension liabilities as a share of GDP and the funding ratio, that is 
pension assets to liabilities. The liabilities as a share of GDP in Finland, 316 % at the 
end of 2017, are vastly greater than in Denmark or the Netherlands. The high value of 
pension liabilities to GDP in Finland can be explained by the ERP system’s longer 
history than its counterparts’ in Denmark and the Netherlands. Liabilities are the 
pension benefits that workers have so far accrued and that are to be paid out as pensions 
when the recipients have retired. Tikanmäki et al. (2019) have calculated the 2017 
Finnish pension liabilities using a discount rate of 2,5 % through 2028 and 3,5 % after. 
If the discount rate was lower, the value of the pension liabilities would increase. This 
could be understood as the price of providing the earned pension benefits increasing. 
Index-linked increases to pension benefits are the greatest contributor to annual 
increases in pension liabilities in Finland (Poutiainen & Tenhunen, 2020). 
The Finnish ERP system is partly funded, which means a part of the assets required to 
pay out future benefits exist as accumulated pension assets, while most of the annual 
benefits paid out are financed by incoming contributions. The funded share of 
contributions in the TyEL scheme has ranged from 8,8 % to 24,1 % over 2007-2019, 
being on average 19,2 % (FCP, 2020b). One of the arguments for the partly funded 
system is that when there are negative economic developments, the contributions or 
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benefits do not need to be adjusted as quickly to retain a healthy funding ratio. Instead, 
the required updates to the system can be reviewed over time and the risk of falling 
income in the system is shared with future generations (Barr, 2013). 
The OP systems in Denmark and the Netherland are fully funded, meaning the assets 
required to pay out benefits in the future are mostly accumulated with the contribution 
payments made to the system. Investment returns further increase assets. In the Danish 
DB pensions, a small share of the contribution is transferred to a pension fund’s bonus 
potential, which is a pool of assets used for targeting higher investment returns for all 
scheme participants. In case the bonus potential has not been consumed in ensuring 
the promised benefit level, participants receive their share back upon retirement. 
However, some Dutch DB schemes are facing contribution rate increases or benefit 
cuts, as the prevailing interest rate regime has made providing the promised benefit 
levels more expensive (Reuters, 2020). 
Table 1: Pension liabilities to GDP and assets to pension liabilities (DNB, 2020a; Statistics 
Denmark, 2020; Statistics Netherlands, 2020a; Tikanmäki et al., 2019; own calculations) 
Finland
Pension liabilities 31.12.2017
Discount rate Pension system Liabilities, € bn % of GDP Pension assets, € bn Funding ratio
Statutory ERP system 714,5 316 % 202,3 28,3 %
Private sector 414,2 183 % 126,2 30,5 %
Public sector 231,8 103 % 71,9 31,0 %
Denmark
Occupational pension provisions
Provision type Provisions, DKK bn % of GDP % of Total provisions Assets, DKK bn Funding ratio
Total provisions 3 449,22                  153,6 % 3 925,42           113,8 %
Average rate pensions 2 203,18                  63,9 %
Of which bonus potential 173,90                    
Market rate pensions 1 124,22                  32,6 %
Total provisions 3 888,89                  167,5 % 4 521,95           116,3 %
Average rate pensions 2 424,51                  62,3 %
Of which bonus potential 242,55                    
Market rate pensions 1 319,32                  33,9 %
Netherlands
Occupational pension provisions
Provision type Provisions, € bn % of GDP % of Total provisions Assets, € bn Funding ratio
Total provisions 1 286,19                  171,7 % 1 328,71           103,3 %
DB schemes 1 160,60                  90,2 %
DC schemes 9,22                        0,7 %
Hybrid schemes 62,57                      4,9 %
Total provisions 1 500,33                  192,6 % 1 560,70           104,0 %
DB schemes 1 205,62                  80,4 %
DC schemes 12,06                      0,8 %
Hybrid schemes 52,20                      3,5 %
31.12.2018
31.12.2019
31.12.2018
31.12.2019
2,5% through 
2028, 3,5 % 
after
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Figure 2 depicts the pension expenditures and contributions as a share of GDP in 
Finland. The total expenditures include all social security pension payments and the 
total contributions include government contributions paid with tax funds. The 
earnings-related pension figures include both TyEL and JuEL expenditures and 
contributions. In 2019 the estimated gap in earnings-related pension income and 
expenditure is -2,4 %-points of GDP (FCP, 2020b). The Finnish population will grow 
until the mid-2030s and then start declining. The ratio of 65-year-olds and older to the 
working age population (15-64 years of age) will keep increasing until 2085 due to 
low fertility and increasing life expectancy. The ratio was 34,2 % in 2017 and is 
estimated to be 66,1 % in 2085. Pension expenditure as a share of GDP is expected to 
increase considerably towards 2085 due to the working age population shrinking. The 
contribution rate in the ERP system is expected to start increasing rapidly from the 
current 24,4 % around 2050 due to low fertility and to rise above 30 % in the 2070s 
(Tikanmäki et al., 2019). 
Figure 2: Earnings-related pension benefits and contributions as a share of GDP in Finland 
(FCP, 2020a; FCP, 2020b; Reipas, 2019; Statistics Finland, 2020a). * = Statistics Finland 
(2020a) preliminary GDP records; ** = Reipas (2019) estimates. 
Figure 3 presents the Danish OP benefits and contributions to GDP. Denmark has a 
public first-pillar pension system, which forms a significant part of overall pensions. 
EC (2018) state that the public pension benefits were 10 % of GDP in 2016. EC 
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estimates the public pension benefits will decrease to 8,1 % of GDP by 2070, while 
private sector OP benefits will increase to 7,0 % of GDP by 2070. The Danish OP 
system is not yet mature, but funds and pension rights are still being built, which is 
why the private sector pensions seem low as a share of GDP. More OP system 
participants start retiring in the 2030s, which shows as the benefits to GDP ratio 
increasing from thereon (ibid.). For comparison, the ERP system benefits in Finland 
made up 89,5 % of total pension provision in 2019, whereas the OP system in Denmark 
made up roughly 1/3 in 2016 (EC, 2018; FCP, 2020b). 
Figure 3: Occupational pension benefits and contributions as a share of GDP in Denmark 
(ATP, 2020; EC, 2018; Forsikring og Pension, 2020; LD, 2020; Statistics Denmark, 2020). * 
= EC (2018) estimates. 
Figure 4 presents the Dutch OP system benefits and contributions to GDP. Similarly 
to Danish second pillar pensions, the Dutch OP system is young, which shows as the 
contribution income being higher than benefits until 2016. The Netherlands also have 
a significant public first pillar pension system, which EC (2018) reports at 7,3 % of 
GDP. Public pension expenditure is estimated to rise to 8,5 % of GDP in 2040 and 
then to decline to 7,9 % in 2070. The private sector OP benefits make up around 40 % 
of total pension benefits. The peaking private sector benefits in 2040 are due to large 
age cohorts retiring at that time (ibid.). As their pension savings are already funded, 
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the amount of pension assets will diminish accordingly, and immediate contribution 
rate hikes are not required. 
Figure 4: Occupational pension benefits and contributions as a share of GDP in the 
Netherlands (DNB, 2020a; EC, 2018; Statistics Netherlands, 2020a). * = EC (2018) estimates. 
Figure 5 shows the administration and investment costs of the OP systems in Denmark, 
Finland and the Netherlands. The costs have been pushed the lowest in Denmark, while 
historically the highest administration costs have been incurred in Finland. Jensen et 
al. (2019b) attribute the historically lower administration and investment costs in 
Denmark and the Netherlands to the fact that pension arrangements are made at the 
sectoral level instead of company level. The mandatory nature of the pension system 
in all three countries is accredited with limiting adverse selection. Better Finance 
(2019) quotes a 2014 study by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets, which 
presented that a 0,1 %-point annual decrease in costs leads to 3 %-points higher 
retirement income in a medium period of 25 years. 
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Figure 5: Admin and investment costs, % of assets in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands 
(DNB, 2020a; FCP, 2020b; OECD, 2020; Statistics Denmark, 2020). 
Figure 6 shows the employment rate for the 15-64-year-old population in Finland, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands. Data until 2019 shows Finland already lagging 
considerably and forecasts show the gap widening towards the end of the century (EC, 
2018; Tikanmäki et al., 2019; Statistics Netherlands, 2020a). However, the forecasts 
pre-date the COVID-19 pandemic, meaning the trends will likely be lower for all three 
countries in the near term. The pandemic’s effects will be discussed in chapter 4.3. 
Employment data is an important indicator for the funding sustainability of a pension 
system, especially for a partly funded DB system like in Finland. MMGPI (2019) has 
consistently recommended Finland to improve its labor force participation especially 
among older ages and expressed worry over intergenerational equality in the Finnish 
ERP system. The removal of unemployment pathways to retirement (eläkeputki) could 
increase employment by 5 000 – 10 000 workers, but the effect is hard to quantify. The 
Finnish employment rate is depressed by incapacity for work caused by mental and 
other health issues, and by the lack of part-time employment, which is common among 
the young and the old elsewhere (Kauppalehti, 2020). 
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Figure 6: The Finnish, Danish and Dutch employment rates for 15-64-year-olds (EC, 2018; 
Statistics Denmark, 2020; Statistics Finland, 2020a; Statistics Netherlands, 2020a; Tikanmäki 
et al., 2019). * = EC (2018), Tikanmäki et al. (2019) estimates. 
Figure 7 presents the old-age dependency ratio (ODR), the number of 65+ year-olds 
to 15-64-year-olds, and the system dependency ratio (SDR), the number of pensioners 
to the number of employed (EC, 2018). The SDR in Finland is quite high compared to 
that in Denmark or the Netherlands in figures 8 and 9, especially in the estimates for 
the latter half of the century. As the Finnish ERP system is partly funded, the increasing 
SDR translates to an increasing pressure on the workforce to make relatively higher 
pension contributions. Pension expenditure as a share of GDP to the ODR is a measure 
of a pension system’s resistance to an aging demographic (Chybalski, 2015). The 
lower the value, the greater the system’s resistance is. The ratio is also higher in 
Finland compared to Denmark and the Netherlands. However, this is partly due to the 
higher pension expenditure as a share of GDP in Finland, which itself is due to the 
ERP system making up most of the pension benefit in Finland. The OP systems in 
Denmark and the Netherlands make up less than half of the total pension benefit. 
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Figure 7: ODR, SDR, and the pension system’s resistance to demographic change, FIN (FCP, 
2020b; MoF, 2020a; Statistics Finland, 2020a; Tikanmäki et al., 2019; own calculations). * = 
Tikanmäki et al. (2019) estimates. 
Figure 8 shows the ODR, SDR and pension expenditure as a share of GDP to the ODR 
for Denmark. All the indicators show lower values than in Finland, an indication of 
the higher employment rate and more sustainable demographic development in 
Denmark. The low values for the pension expenditure as a share of GDP to ODR are 
due to both a more sustainable ODR and lower pension expenditure to GDP, as this 
comparison only considers the OP system expenditure, not total pension expenditure 
including public pensions. 
Figure 8: ODR, SDR, and the pension system’s resistance to demographic change, DNK (EC, 
2018; Forsikring og Pension, 2020; Statistics Denmark, 2020; own calculations). * = EC 
(2018) estimates. 
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Figure 9 presents the ODR, SDR and the indicator for the OP system’s resistance to 
demographic changes in the Netherlands. The ODR is the lowest of the three in the 
Netherlands, while the SDR is slightly higher than in Denmark, indicating a higher 
share of pensioners to the employed. The pension expenditure as a share of GDP to 
ODR peaks at around 2030, which is due to the expected retirement of large age 
cohorts, increasing the value of pension benefits paid out temporarily.  
Figure 9: ODR, SDR, and the pension system’s resistance to demographic change, NLD (EC, 
2018; Statistics Netherlands, 2020a; own calculations). * = EC (2018) estimates. 
The average effective retirement ages in figure 10 show that after 2013, Finland has 
fallen behind Denmark and the Netherlands in the sense that workers retire earlier. The 
average effective retirement age in Finland in 2019 was 64,0 years, while in Denmark 
it was 65,9 years. EC (2018) made forecasts of the future average retirement age in all 
three countries, and towards the end of the century, Finland is projected to be catching 
up again. A higher retirement age enables individuals to accumulate a greater pension 
in anticipation of increasing life-expectancies, but in Finland it also means workers 
contribute to paying current pensions for longer, easing the long-term funding 
prospects of the system. Tikanmäki et al. (2019) make forecasts of the expected 
retirement age for a 25-year-old, which is dragging behind both the realized average 
effective retirement age and the forecasts, due to mental and other illnesses causing 
incapacity for work. 
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Figure 10: The average effective retirement ages, expected retirement age in Finland (EC, 
2018; Tikanmäki et al., 2019; FCP, 2020b; Forsikring og Pension, 2020; Statistics 
Netherlands, 2020b). * = EC (2018), Tikanmäki et al. (2019) estimates. 
Table 2 shows the gross and net pension replacement rates in Denmark, Finland and 
the Netherlands at different income levels as calculated by the OECD (2020). The 
Finnish replacement rates are stable regardless of the income class, and while the 
Netherlands exhibit a similar pattern, the replacement rates in Denmark are much more 
progressive depending on the pensioner’s earlier income. Replacement rates in Finland 
are also noticeably lower than in Denmark or the Netherlands, except for the highest 
paid workers, for whom the net replacement rate edges higher than in Denmark. 
Table 2: The 2018 gross and net pension replacement rates at different income levels (OECD, 
2020). 
Figure 11 presents the average monthly pension to the average monthly salary in 
Finland and Denmark. The Netherlands are omitted because no unambiguous record 
of the average pension was found. The average earnings are from OECD (2020), while 
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the average pensions are from FCP (2020b) and Statistics Denmark (2020). Figure 11 
supports OECD’s (2020) figures visible in table 2, in that pensions in Denmark are 
higher than in Finland. 
Figure 11: The Finnish and Danish average pensions to average earnings (FCP, 2020b; 
OECD, 2020; Statistics Denmark, 2020; own calculations). 
3.2 Investments  
Figure 12 shows the annual real returns of the Danish and Dutch OP systems and of 
the Finnish TyEL and JuEL pension funds Elo, Ilmarinen, Varma, Veritas, and Keva 
and VER. FCP (2020a) provides fund specific real returns in absolute terms, which 
have been used to calculate the total real return for the funds by weighting. The Finnish 
funds showcase somewhat more volatile returns. The Danish pension funds have 
traditionally had a high allocation to fixed-return assets which performed considerably 
better during the Financial Crisis than stocks and helped the funds avoid greater losses 
(Aaltonen et al., 2017).  
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Figure 12: 2008-2018 annual real returns of the Danish and Dutch OP systems and of the 
Finnish private and public sector ERP funds (FCP, 2020a; Better Finance, 2019; own 
calculations). 
Table 3 continues by showing the 2014-2018 and 2008-2018 average annual real 
returns and the cumulative returns over the period for the Danish and Dutch OP 
systems and the Finnish TyEL and JuEL funds. Finland is lagging behind in the 
average annual real returns, although the cumulative returns over the period are quite 
close to those of the Netherlands’. 
Table 3: 2008-2018 average annual and cumulative real returns of the Danish and Dutch OP 
systems and the Finnish private and public sector ERP funds (FCP, 2020a; Better Finance, 
2019; own calculations). 
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Real returns p.a.
Year Netherlands Denmark Finland
2014-2018 4,49 % 4,32 % 4,06 %
2008-2018 3,26 % 4,73 % 3,08 %
Cumul. 2008-2018 35,87 % 52,02 % 33,90 %
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Table 4 shows the fund-specific real returns over 2015-2019 and 2010-2019 of the 
Finnish TyEL and JuEL funds in blue, five of the Netherlands’ largest pension funds 
in orange, and the first-pillar ATP of Denmark with four other largest pension funds 
in Denmark in red. The four Finnish TyEL funds, Elo, Ilmarinen, Varma and Veritas, 
are bound by solvency capital requirements, unlike the public sector Keva and VER. 
The public sector funds have achieved 0,29 – 1,01 %-points higher average annual real 
returns over 2010-2019 than their private sector counterparts bound by stricter capital 
requirements. All the pension funds present from Denmark and the Netherlands, 
except ATP, are also bound by solvency capital requirements yet have managed 
considerably higher annual returns than either types of funds in Finland. 
Table 4: Company specific average annual returns, 2010-2019 (bpfBOUW, 2020; Danica 
Pension, 2020; FCP, 2020a; PensionDanmark, 2020; PFA Pension, 2020; PME, 2020; PMT, 
2020; Velliv Pension, 2020; own calculations). 
Figure 13 shows the asset allocation of all Finnish pension assets over 1999-2019 
(TELA, 2020). The share of equities and equity funds has increased through the period 
to 57,8 % at year-end 2019, leading to an allocation remotely reminiscent of a 60/40 
distribution. The Finnish law places an upper limit of 65 % to equity allocation for 
private sector pension funds to limit excessive risk-taking, and though most funds have 
increased their equity allocations, the public sector pension funds and indirect equity 
investments through funds push the overall statistics higher. 
Real returns p.a., fund specific
2015-2019 2010-2019
Elo 5,26 % 4,71 %
Ilmarinen 5,04 % 4,60 %
Varma 4,70 % 4,61 %
Veritas 5,12 % 4,73 %
Keva 5,34 % 5,61 %
VER 5,08 % 5,02 %
ABP 5,46 % 6,83 %
PFZW 5,66 % 7,17 %
PME 5,35 %
PMT 5,87 %
bpfBOUW 6,31 %
ATP 5,98 % 9,08 %
PFA Pension market rate products 5,52 % 6,51 %
Danica Pension market rate products 5,02 % 5,62 %
PensionDanmark 5,66 %
Velliv Pension 6,26 %
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Figure 13: Finnish pension asset allocation 1999-2019 (TELA, 2020). 
Figures 14 and 15 (Forsikring og Pension, 2020) show Danish pension funds have 
traditionally placed a significant allocation into fixed-income instruments. However, 
the allocation into the other assets class, which includes the assets of market-rate or 
DC pension schemes, has increased considerably, and constituted 39,7 % of all assets 
at year-end 2018. The increase is due to an on-going shift from average-rate, or DB, 
to market-rate pension products, a result of the persistent low-interest rate regime and 
rising life-expectancy (DKNB, 2020). 
Figure 14: Pension asset allocation for Danish life-insurance and pension companies 2005-
2018 (Forsikring og Pension, 2020). 
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The asset allocation of market-rate pension funds is not disclosed in detail by 
Forsikring og Pension or the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA). The 
volume of assets has increased considerably in the period as the Danish OP system is 
not yet mature, meaning contribution income is greater than paid benefits (Jensen et 
al., 2019a). Figures 14 and 15 (Forsikring og Pension, 2020) include the pension assets 
of life-insurance companies, sectoral and company pension funds, ATP, the special 
pension savings scheme (SP) and LD Pensions, and are thus comparable to the Finnish 
ERP system’s assets, and are in accordance with DKNB’s definitions of life-insurance 
companies and pension funds (DKNB, 2019). 
Figure 15: Pension assets of Danish life-insurance and pension companies in DKK bn, 2005-
2018 (Forsikring og Pension, 2020). 
DKNB (2019) reports that at the end of 2019Q3, the sector had allocated 
approximately 43,8 % into fixed-income, 27,8 % into equities, and 28,4 % into 
investment funds. The investment funds have also invested in fixed-income and 
equities, and with look-through the allocations are approximately 56,3 % in fixed-
income and 38,5 % in equities, the rest in further investment funds (ibid.). At year-end 
2019, the life-insurance and pension sector’s combined assets were DKK 4 521,95 bn, 
standing at 194,8 % of GDP, while provisions were DKK 3 888,89 bn, or 167,5 % of 
GDP (Statistics Denmark, 2020). Provisions are the capital the companies must reserve 
to meet benefit commitments – in case of average rate products, it is the capital needed 
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to meet guaranteed commitments, and in case of market rate products, it is the market 
value of the assets (DKNB, 2019). 
Figure 16 shows the Dutch pension industry has placed a heavy allocation into equities, 
59,6 % on average. Dutch pension funds have no regulation-imposed upper limits to 
equity allocations, but the funds must keep their funding ratios above certain limits to 
avoid having to make plans for improving their financial status, to increase 
contribution rates, or to make benefit cuts (DNB, 2020b). 
Figure 16: Dutch pension asset allocation 2006-2019 (DNB, 2020a). 
Table 5 presents the fund-specific asset allocations of the largest pension funds in 
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands in 2019. Different from what the total asset 
allocation data in figures 13, 14 and 16 suggested, the Finnish pension funds have the 
largest direct allocations into equities. Further equity investments are made through 
investment funds, which are included in the Other asset class. Table 5 also shows the 
higher allocations into fixed-income assets for the Danish and Dutch funds.  
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Table 5: Allocations of the largest pension funds in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands 
(bpfBOUW, 2020; Danica Pension, 2020; FCP, 2020a; PensionDanmark, 2020; PFA Pension, 
2020; PME, 2020; PMT, 2020; Velliv Pension, 2020; own calculations). 
The Danish pension funds, except ATP, have a solvency capital requirement similar 
to that in Finland: the funds must be able to meet obligations to policyholders over the 
next 12 months with a minimum probability of 99,5 % (Finanstilsynet, 2017). In 
Finland the private sector pension funds have a solvency capital requirement of being 
able to cover potentially realizing risks over the next 12 months with a 97 % minimum 
probability (FCP, 2020a). The funding ratio in the Netherlands measures the pension 
funds’ health: with a ratio above 110 %, the fund is healthy and can apply index-linked 
increases to pension benefits; with a ratio of 104 – 110 %, indexation must be ceased; 
and with a ratio below 104 %, the funds must take action to remedy their financial 
position (DNB, 2020b). Table 6 presents the solvency ratios of the Finnish TyEL funds 
and the four largest Danish OP funds, and the funding ratio of the five largest Dutch 
pension funds. Both the Danish and Dutch OP systems are fully funded, yet the Dutch 
funds lag far behind their Danish counterparts in financial health. 
2019 asset allocation, fund-specific
Equity Fixed-income Other
PMT 29,4 % 61,5 % 9,1 %
PME 37,5 % 57,1 % 5,4 %
bpfBOUW 25,4 % 33,5 % 41,2 %
ABP 36,3 % 33,3 % 30,3 %
PFZW 30,9 % 40,4 % 28,7 %
PFA Pension 28,1 % 58,6 % 13,3 %
ATP 13,6 % 65,5 % 20,9 %
Danica Pension 25,7 % 44,0 % 30,3 %
PensionDanmark 36,3 % 41,1 % 22,6 %
Velliv Pension 16,0 % 34,3 % 49,7 %
Ilmarinen 47,0 % 33,7 % 19,3 %
Varma 46,2 % 26,6 % 27,2 %
VER 51,4 % 38,0 % 10,6 %
Keva 53,2 % 22,0 % 24,8 %
Elo 48,4 % 32,3 % 19,3 %
Veritas 39,7 % 36,3 % 23,9 %
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Table 6: The funding ratios of the largest Danish and Dutch pension funds and the solvency 
rate of the Finnish TyEL funds (bpfBOUW, 2020; Danica Pension, 2020; FCP, 2020a; 
PensionDanmark, 2020; PFA Pension, 2020; PME, 2020; PMT, 2020; Velliv Pension, 2020; 
own calculations). 
3.3 MMGPI scores 
MMGPI (2019) ranks pension systems based on three sub-indices: adequacy, 
sustainability, and integrity. Adequacy makes up 40 % of the final grade and considers 
the level of benefits provided and facts about household wealth as indicators of 
financial security in retirement. Sustainability makes up 35 % of the grade and 
considers the long-term financial sustainability of the pension system. Integrity makes 
up the final 25 % of the grade and considers the pension system’s regulation and 
governance; protection and communication for members; and operating costs. Each 
indicator has a possible score of 0 – 10 points and each indicator is weighed differently 
as seen fit by MMGPI (ibid.). As the focus of this thesis is on the sustainability of the 
Finnish ERP system, the focus here will be on the sustainability sub-index and its 
scoring. 
Table 7 shows the adequacy sub-index scores of Denmark, Finland, and the 
Netherlands. Denmark ranks 4th, Finland 7th and the Netherlands 3rd in the sub-index. 
The indicators Finland loses the most against Denmark and the Netherlands are the 
minimum pension as a percentage of the average wage a retiree will receive as benefits; 
Funding ratios, fund-specific
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015-2019 avg.
Elo 124 % 124 % 126 % 121 % 124 % 124 %
Ilmarinen 130 % 129 % 131 % 124 % 127 % 128 %
Varma 131 % 131 % 134 % 128 % 131 % 131 %
Veritas 128 % 130 % 132 % 126 % 127 % 129 %
PFA Pension 302 % 285 % 215 % 286 % 247 % 267 %
Danica Pension 201 % 249 % 228 % 203 % 198 % 216 %
PensionDanmark 357 % 378 % 418 % 424 % 362 % 388 %
Velliv Pension 163 % 164 % 179 % 183 % 161 % 170 %
PME pensioen 96 % 96 % 102 % 98 % 99 % 98 %
PMT pensioen 98 % 97 % 102 % 99 % 99 % 99 %
bpfBOUW 109 % 111 % 118 % 114 % 114 % 113 %
ABP 97 % 97 % 104 % 97 % 98 % 99 %
PFZW 95 % 95 % 101 % 97 % 99 % 97 %
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the net replacement rate for a range of income earners; and the consideration of 
individuals’ accrued pension assets in the division of assets in case of a couple’s 
divorce or separation (MMGPI, 2019). 
Table 8 covers the sustainability sub-index. Denmark ranks 1st, Finland 10th and the 
Netherlands 2nd in sustainability. Finland loses against Denmark and the Netherlands 
the most in funding level-associated indicators. The level of public debt, economic 
growth figures, and the total fertility rate and projected 2040 old-age dependency ratio 
set Finland back further. The sustainability scoring in MMGPI (2019) favors funded 
pension systems, based on the argument of fully funded pension systems more likely 
being able to meet payments in the future. The Finnish ERP system is at a disadvantage 
with its partial funding, as roughly only one third of pension liabilities are funded. 
MMGPI (2019) recommends Finland to improve the labor force participation among 
older ages and to increase the level of contributions. Higher contributions would allow 
a higher funded level of assets, which would increase the likelihood of being able to 
make benefit payments in the future and allow for greater investment assets to 
accumulate returns on, further easing the Finnish ERP system’s financial position. 
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Table 7: Adequacy sub-index indicators (MMGPI, 2019). 
Denmark Finland Netherlands
1)
(17,5 %)
What is the minimum pension, as a percentage of the average wage, 
that a single person will receive?
How is the minimum pension increased or adjusted over time? Are 
these increases or adjustments made on a regular basis?
10,0 5,4 8,4
2)
(25,0 %) What is the net replacement rate for a range of income earners?
10,0 9,1 9,6
3)
(10,0 %)
What is the net household saving rate in the country?
What is the net household debt to GDP ratio?
1,1 3,3 2,7
4)
(5,0 %)
Are voluntary member contributions made by a median-income earner 
to a funded pension plan treated by the tax system more favorably than 
similar savings in a bank account?
Is the investment earned by pension plans exempt from tax in the pre 
retirement and/or post retirement periods?
4,0 7,0 10,0
5)
(10,0 %)
Is there a minimum access age to receive benefits from the private 
pension plans (except for death, invalidity and/or cases of significant 
financial hardship)?
If so, what is the current age?
10,0 10,0 5,0
6)
(10,0 %)
What proportion, if any, of the retirement benefit from the private 
pension arrangements is required to be taken as an income stream?
Are there any tax incentives that exist to encourage taking up of income 
streams?
6,7 7,5 7,5
7)
(7,5 %)
On resignation from employment, are plan members normally entitled to 
the full vesting of their accrued benefit?
After resignation, is the value of the member's accrued benefit normally 
maintained in real terms (either by inflation-linked indexation or through 
market investment returns)?
Can a member's benefit entitlements normally be transferred to another 
private pension plan on the member's resignation from an employer?
10,0 10,0 10,0
8)
(4,0 %)
Upon a couple's divorce or separation, are the individuals' accrued 
pension assets normally taken into account in the overall division of 
assets?
0,0 0,0 10,0
9)
(5,0 %) What is the level of home ownership in the country?
5,4 6,4 6,1
10)
(5,0 %) What is the proportion of total pension assets invested in growth assets?
10,0 10,0 10,0
11)
(1,0 %)
Is it a requirement that an individual continues to accrue their retirement 
benefit in a private pension plan when they receive income support such 
as a disability pension or on paid maternity leave?
0,0 10,0 0,0
Adequacy sub-index 77,5 73,2 78,5
Adequacy
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Table 8: Sustainability sub-index indicators (MMGPI, 2019). 
The first sustainability indicator awards full points for coverage of 80 % or above. The 
indicator is given a relatively large weight based on a high coverage rate increasing a 
system’s future sustainability and reducing pressure on government social security 
spending. The second indicator awards full points for funded pension assets of 175 % 
of GDP or above. The second indicator includes assets held in private and public 
schemes and its weight is also quite large, as the size of assets set aside is deemed a 
good indicator of a pension system’s ability to meet future payments. The third 
indicator has four questions and their average forms the indicator score. The weight is 
large since four questions are covered under a single indicator. A later retirement age 
is favored to reduce pressure on the size of needed funds for making payments under 
an increasing life-expectancy, and a high TFR helps with the score – immigration is 
believed to be only a short-term patch on low fertility. The fourth indicator awards 
points for the net funded level of mandatory contributions as a percentage of earnings 
Denmark Finland Netherlands
1)
(20,0 %)
What proportion of the working age population are members of private 
pension plans?
10,0 10,0 10,0
2)
(15,0 %)
What is the level of pension assets, expressed as a percentage of GDP, 
held in private pension arrangements, public pension reserve funds, 
protected book reserves and pension insurance contracts?
10,0 4,0 10,0
3)
(20,0 %)
What is the current gap between life expectancy at birth and the state 
pension age? What is the projected gap between life expectancy at birth 
and the state pension age in 2040? (This calculation allows for mortality 
improvement.) What is the projected old-age dependancy ratio in 2040? 
What is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) averaged over 2015-2020?
6,2 4,3 5,1
4)
(10,0 %)
What is the level of mandatory contributions that are set aside for 
retirement benefits (i.e. funded), expressed as a percentage of wages? 
These include mandatory employer and/or employee contributions 
towards funded public benefits (i.e. social security) and/or private 
retirement benefits.
10,0 3,9 10,0
5)
(10,0 %)
What is the labor force participation rate for those aged 55-64?
What is the labor force participation rate for those aged 65+?
7,2 6,5 6,7
6)
(10,0 %)
What is the level of adjusted government debt (being the gross public 
debt reduced by the size of any sovereign wealth funds that are not set 
aside for future pension liabilities), expressed as a percentage of GDP?
7,7 5,9 6,2
7)
(5,0 %)
In respect of private pension arrangements, are older employees able to 
access part of their retirement savings or pension and continue working 
(e.g. part time)?
If yes, can employees continue to contribute and accrue benefits at an 
appropriate rate?
10,0 10,0 10,0
8)
(10,0 %)
What is the real economic growth averaged over the last four years and 
projected for the next three years?
4,9 4,7 5,1
Sustainability sub-index 82,0 60,7 78,3
Sustainability
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– funded contributions of 12 % or more award full points. Indicator five supports 
higher labor force participation at older ages, which translates to retirement starting 
later and a reduced level of benefits needed, while enabling higher accumulated 
savings. Indicator six awards full points for adjusted government debt of zero % of 
GDP and a zero score for adjusted government debt of 150 % of GDP or more. The 
argument is that high government debt increases the chances of reductions in the level 
or coverage of social security benefits. Indicator seven supports a system where 
retirees may gradually phase into retirement and decrease their workload, while 
continuing to contribute and accrue benefits. The eighth indicator gives points for real 
economic growth, the argument being that real economic growth will improve the 
pension system’s sustainability as its financial position is improved along with the 
entire host-economy (MMGPI, 2019). 
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4 POLICY DISCUSSION IN FINLAND 
4.1 Demographic and economic developments as the basis 
The aging of populations and decreasing fertility rates are problems common to most 
developed economies and threaten pension systems also, leading to active policy 
discussions. Nopola & Tikanmäki (2020) suggest the current record-low fertility in 
Finland is due to the postponement of having children, and that after the postponement 
ends due to biological limits, fertility will rise, providing pension funding some long-
term relief. Aaltonen et al. (2017) assert the Finnish ERP system’s sustainability is 
based on the assumptions of balanced demographic developments; adequate economic 
growth, productivity, and high employment; and decent investment returns, and that 
these measures are under threat. Pikkarainen (2017) asserts the sustainability of the 
ERP system depends primarily on the Finnish economy’s success and adaptation to 
global economic shocks, instead of investment returns. 
Mielonen (2020) asserts that employment developments are crucial for the funding of 
a partially funded pension system such as in Finland. Aaltonen et al. (2017) assert that 
a 1,3 % annual growth in GDP only suffices to maintain current unemployment. Reipas 
(2019) estimates the employment rate in Finland in 2025 at 72,7 % and expects it to 
grow to 73,8 % by 2045 and then slowly up to 74,1 % by 2085. Statistics Finland 
(2020b) reports the March 2020 employment rate trend at 72,9 %, down from 73,0 % 
in February, and the factual employment rate at 71,3 %, down from 71,8 % in March 
2019. Kautto (2020b) and Kiander (2020) anticipate the employment rate to shrink 
more following the COVID-19 pandemic. Varma (2020) notes that employment had 
been developing positively for several years with economic growth, but the growth 
weakened in 2019, and that the current employment rate is not enough to finance the 
expenses of a welfare state in a sustainable manner. Riekhoff (2019) notes that the 
employment rates among the older working population in Finland, especially for men, 
are lagging behind other Nordics. Barr (2013) discusses the same issue and suggests 
limiting the dependency of the national and guarantee pensions on accrued pension 
rights for workers starting their careers late or who have been aside from employment 
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for a long period to serve as an incentive to seek employment. The required funding 
could be achieved by considering not only the income but also wealth of the national 
and guarantee pension recipients, thus limiting the number of recipients. 
The aging of the population, increasing life-expectancy and low fertility rates will lead 
to more pensioners in relation to the employed, creating pressure to increase the 24,4 
% contribution rate for a relatively smaller population of employed in the future. 
Tikanmäki et al. (2019) estimate the contribution rate to increase to around 25 % by 
the end of the 2020s. A sustainable long-term contribution rate in the private sector 
would be 26,7 %, given the change was implemented immediately, and 27,6 % in the 
public sector (ibid.). The assumptions are based on an employment rate of 73,4 % by 
2025 and on average 73 % there onwards. Nopola & Tikanmäki (2020) consider a 
newer demographic forecast and, depending on the fertility rate, assert the sustainable 
contribution rate is likely in the range of 24,6-26,6 % in the private sector and 25,4-
27,4 % in the public sector. 
The Family Federation of Finland (Väestöliitto) (2020) published a report on the 
effects of low fertility, the decreasing population and the increasing dependency ratio 
on the Finnish economy and the ERP system. Väestöliitto calls for an active population 
policy to support increases in the total fertility rate. The low total fertility is said to 
affect the pension systems more than public finances, yet Väestöliitto asserts that the 
magnitude of future investment returns is even more significant for the long-term 
funding sustainability of the Finnish ERP system than demographic factors. In the long 
run, low fertility means both the income and paid benefits in the pension system 
decrease. What is felt sooner however, is the considerable increase of the pensioner 
population compared to the employed population. This creates pressure to increase the 
TyEL contribution rate for those employed. Väestöliitto (ibid.) states that increasing 
employment participation would help the funding position of the ERP system over a 
period of a few decades but cannot neutralize the effect of expected demographic 
changes. If the total fertility rate of 1,8 that Finland had at the start of the 2000s could 
be returned, the challenges presented by demographic changes to the ERP system 
would mostly be solved (ibid.). 
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Employers oppose raising the contribution rate further to avoid a loss of 
competitiveness. The demographic change is projected to increase the costs of pension 
provision at a faster rate than before, in part due to retiring people on average having 
earned higher incomes than before. In 2019 the number of people receiving ERP 
benefits grew by 20 000, while the average beginning old-age pension was €60 / month 
higher than a year before, leading to pension provision costs increasing by €1 bn 
without increases made in the benefits (Kautto, 2020a). The growth rate is projected 
to continue through the 2020s, with the number of pensioners growing by 200 000 
from the current 1,48 million. The annual contribution income in the Finnish ERP 
system has been below the level of paid benefits since 2009, leading to an increasing 
role of funded pension assets and achieved returns in funding the system.  (FCP, 2020a; 
Kautto, 2020a; Siimes, 2020). 
Figure 17: Earnings-related pension income and expenses, € m (FCP, 2020b). 
Gruber et al. (2019) show an increase of up to 40 % in retirement decisions in 2005 
when the minimum retirement age dropped from 65 to 63 years, despite the accrual 
rate between 63-68 years increasing, indicating that workers often retire at the earliest 
possibility. In 2017, the minimum retirement age began to rise gradually, the 1962 
cohort being the first with a minimum age of 65 again, and the minimum age being 
 (20 000,00)
 (15 000,00)
 (10 000,00)
 (5 000,00)
 -
 5 000,00
 10 000,00
 15 000,00
 20 000,00
 25 000,00
 30 000,00
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 2017* 2018* 2019*
Earnings-related pension contributions, paid benefits, 
investment returns, € m.
Contributions Paid benefits Investment returns
 
52 
 
tied to life expectancy for cohorts from 1965 onwards (FCP, 2020a). Barr (2013) 
supports creating further incentives for postponing retirement from the earliest 
possible date and suggests age-dependent pension right accrual. Jensen et al. (2019b) 
also support enabling age-dependent pension saving profiles, including choice over 
the timing and risk profile of savings. 
The Finnish social and health care sector has been under reform-aspirations for a long 
time and partly in anticipation the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (STM) drafted 
a report on combining the public and private ERP systems. STM (2019) set out to 
review if combining the systems is possible and indeed worthwhile. The underlying 
philosophy is that a reform of the social and health sectors is likely to cause a shift in 
employment from the public sector to the private, undermining the funding of the 
public pension system. Another point is that abolishing the division would allow 
pension funds to compete for clients across sectors and pension systems would not 
play a role in the production of public services. STM (ibid.) suggests the public sector 
pension company Keva be split in two in the process, creating a new “TyEL-Keva” to 
administer pension rights the same way as the current private sector pension 
companies, and leaving “public-Keva” in existence to administer public pension rights 
with benefits above the TyEL level. Public sector employees born before 1972 may 
have such higher benefits. Keva is to pay a neutralizing lump sum of approximately 
€10,5 bn into the private sector TyEL system to offset the higher costs of the public 
pension system due to the older age of the insured and pensioners and public sector 
employees on average living longer (ibid.). Preparations are underway and the joining 
is to take effect in 2027 (ibid.; Ilmarinen, 2020). 
4.2 Investments and funding 
Koivurinne (2018) comments on the Finnish pension companies’ domestic investment 
focus and asserts that the traditionally high degree of domestic investments is good for 
the domestic economy and employment but goes against modern portfolio theory and 
increases risk should the domestic economy face a downturn. FCP (2020a) shows the 
share of domestic investments has been decreasing for years and currently stands at 
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23,4 %. Investment returns are increasingly important as the pension system’s income 
from contributions is permanently net negative (Siimes, 2020). A percentage point’s 
change in investment returns causes a change pressure of two percentage points in 
contribution rates (Aaltonen et al., 2017; Vaittinen, 2019). The average real investment 
return over 1997-2019 has been 4,2 % for private sector pension funds and 4,6 % for 
public sector funds (TELA, 2020). 
Figure 18: TyEL and JuEL nominal investment returns (TELA, 2020). 
Rantala (2020) notes that expectations of future investment returns have decreased in 
Finland, and that the IMF has expressed worry over pension funds’ investments 
becoming more illiquid and homogenous, which could lead to simultaneous actions by 
institutional investors precipitating instability in the markets. Aaltonen et al. (2017) 
reported that Finnish pension funds had investment return correlations of 0,94 – 1,00, 
showing some evidence of the worry of homogeneity of pension fund investments in 
Rantala (2020). Rantala (ibid.) asserts the stock allocations for Finnish private sector 
pension funds operating with solvency capital requirements have been 30 – 45 %, 
while public sector funds without solvency capital requirements have had stock 
allocations 10 percentage points higher, with a similar trend internationally. He 
maintains that in Finland the public sector funds have consistently achieved 0,5 – 1,0 
percentage points higher annual investment returns over 2008-2018, depending on the 
sample period. No similar international trend is found however (ibid.). 
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The private sector pension companies have a minimum return requirement of 3 %, 
which is the rate pension funds must be topped annually. Together with the fund-
increasing supplementary factor, the actual return requirement is 4,05 % starting 1 
January 2020 and has been 3,68 – 5,28 % over the past five years. Considering the 
prevailing low-interest rate regime has continued for years, Rantala (2020) finds that 
the return requirements and the level of risk allowed for pension funds regulation-wise 
are in conflict. Rantala (ibid.) maintains that the high return requirement together with 
strict solvency requirements automatically leads to the funds’ solvency capital 
decreasing, since the requirements must be met with solvency capital in case of poor 
returns. The return requirement cannot be achieved with low-risk interest rate 
instruments like before, while higher-risk instruments bind more solvency capital and 
make operations riskier. At the same time, the present-value of pension liabilities has 
increased considerably due to applicable discount rates in the prevailing interest 
regime – effectively, pension provision has become more expensive (ibid.). 
Aaltonen et al. (2017) suggest a comprehensive reform of the Finnish ERP system. 
The suggested reform holds that earnings-related pensions would remain mandatory 
and have a uniform “pension floor”, a level up to which everyone is required to save 
in a similar-to-current fashion. The individual would have power over how to save 
above the minimum level – as a default option to continue saving in the common 
system, or to decide their saving and risk profile more freely. Taxes from pension 
contributions would remain backloaded while pension asset funding would be 
increased 25 – 50 % from the current levels. The suggestion includes greater individual 
choice over the timing of pension saving and retirement, that savings above the 
minimum level could be withdrawn before retirement, that the solvency capital 
requirement be dropped and that a higher level of investment expertise be required of 
pension fund supervisory board members as suggested by FIN-FSA (ibid.). 
Aaltonen et al. (2017) assert removing the solvency capital requirement would enable 
long-term return-oriented investing, and that the pension funds’ investment returns 
would annually be on average 2 percentage points higher than currently. The authors 
also suggest pension funds be assigned a 60/40 equity-fixed income portfolio to follow 
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with strict tracking error limits to limit risk-taking. The authors admit pension funds 
would end up with similar investment portfolios, but counter by asserting that the funds 
already have investment portfolios with highly correlating returns. Factor investing is 
also suggested as a means to strive for higher returns. Aaltonen et al. (ibid.) support 
combining all the public and private sector pension companies into one, asserting the 
operation could lead to annual administration cost savings of €400 m. 
Pikkarainen (2017) supports the suggestion by Aaltonen et al. (2017) to implement 
stricter investment expertise requirements on the supervisory board members of both 
the public and private pension companies, and suggests employees, pensioners and the 
small-and-medium sized company sector be better represented in the boards. 
Pikkarainen (2017) resists combining all the Finnish pension companies into one. He 
argues the move would have negative implications for the broader economy: the 
diminishing number of investment professionals, making it harder for banks and other 
firms to find skilled labor; a significant outflow of capital from the Finnish financial 
markets, since markets are not perfect and international investors would have weaker 
signals of the Finnish financial market’s direction; and a weakening of the diversity of 
the Finnish financial markets, as there would be fewer agents estimating the risk 
profiles of undertakings. The negative effects that follow are likely greater than the 
gains from administration cost savings resulting from combining the organizations. 
Barr (2013) supports the system of multiple pension funds by arguing that no one fund 
gains overt market power and there is less chance of political influence on investment 
decisions. Pikkarainen (2017) agrees with Aaltonen et al. (2017) that it is unfortunate 
the Finnish pension funds’ investment portfolios have become so homogenous. 
Rantala (2020) suggests relinquishing the fixed discount rate in setting the return 
requirement in the private sector pension system in favor of a market-based discount 
rate. Rantala admits the solvency capital requirements limit investment risk-taking and 
affect allocations. However, he defends the solvency capital requirements on the basis 
of the joint liability of the pension funds – without the requirement, a single fund might 
take on risks that would end up being borne by the greater society. STM (2019) also 
supports upholding the solvency capital requirement due to the joint liability of the 
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pension funds, and argues that should a pension fund fail, the missing funds can only 
be replaced by lifting contribution rates. 
Rantala (2020) suggests the solvency capital positions of the private sector pension 
funds be bolstered by temporarily setting the funding rate from contributions to zero 
or at a significantly lower level than currently. He suggests developing the solvency 
capital requirement in a counter-cyclical fashion to support the pension funds’ long-
term investment horizon, with higher solvency capital requirements during high 
valuation levels and vice versa, and to periodically update the parameters used to 
compute solvency capital requirements based on current market knowledge. Rantala 
(ibid.) supports increasing the direct equity allocation from the current levels below 50 
% to around 60-65 %. 
Kotamäki (2018) asserts that defining the optimal level of pension asset funding is 
similar to the problem of choosing an investment portfolio, and that the optimal level 
depends on the decision-maker’s risk aversion, and the expected growth of wages and 
pension asset returns and their variances and covariances. Kotamäki (ibid.) asserts that 
assuming a lower and probably more realistic level of risk aversion, the level of 
funding would be higher. Increased political influence on the pension system from 
pensioners is anticipated to decrease the level of funding in the pension system due to 
a higher emphasis on the relative consumption power of pensioners (ibid.). Barr (2013) 
suggests widening the funding base of the ERP system, to also include income other 
than earnings in defining the mandatory contribution. Other possibilities suggested are 
incorporating tax funding to support the adaptation of pension funding in economic 
shocks, and the pooling of the ERP pension liabilities through mandatory 
arrangements. 
Aaltonen et al. (2017) advocate for increasing individual choice in pension saving by 
allowing the individual some control over the timing and risk profile of their pension 
savings; more control over the timing of retirement; and a possibility to withdraw 
accumulated pension savings above their minimum pension floor. The reform is hoped 
to increase public interest towards pension saving (ibid.). Jensen et al. (2019b) support 
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the mandatory nature of the ERP system, as it enables wide coverage and limits adverse 
selection. Saving for old age may not be straightforward to everyone and individuals 
may be unable to plan an appropriate saving strategy or be unable to act accordingly. 
The public may not be aware of associated risks, properly understand likelihoods or 
have adequate financial knowledge. The administration of individual accounts could 
bring significant cost increases (ibid.; Barr, 2013). Jensen et al. (2019a) support 
mandatory pension saving and show by using Danish data that mandatory and 
voluntary pension saving are not substitutes: increasing mandatory pension 
contributions would decrease private, voluntary savings by 0-30 %. 
4.3 COVID-19 implications and remedies 
The COVID-19 pandemic has simultaneous negative effects on pension funding 
through both contribution income and investment returns. Furloughs, bankruptcies and 
increasing unemployment decrease income and thus decrease the contributions paid 
into the pension system. Weakened stock market valuations hit pension assets directly 
(Siimes, 2020). The record high global corporate debt at $13,5 trillion, twice the pre-
2008 crisis level in real terms, has a record high estimated share with the potential to 
go sour, likely to further damage pension assets. By 5 May 2020, S&P’s had lowered 
or given a negative outlook on 20 % of the corporate and sovereign debt it monitors 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the oil slump. A fresh study suggests that out of 
the $3 trillion of BBB investment-grade corporate debt, over a third should be junk-
grade (The Economist, 2020b). Figure 19 shows the spread between an index of all 
BBB investment-grade US corporate bonds and spot US Treasury rates spiking at the 
end of February 2020 (FRED, 2020). After an extended period of tightening spreads 
driven by increasing demand for investment grade debt since the 2007-09 crisis, 
investors sharply sold out in face of the COVID-19 crisis. 
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Figure 19: ICE BofA BBB US Corporate Index Option-Adjusted Spread (FRED, 2020). 
The sovereign debt market especially regarding emerging markets also appears 
gloomy, as debt defaults appear likely due to diminished income and foreign capital 
withdrawals. So far 18 sovereigns have had their credit ratings lowered by Fitch, more 
than in any previous year. Since the beginning of January 2020, investors have 
withdrawn over $100 bn from emerging market debt and equities, over three times the 
amount during a similar period in the 2008 crisis. The Economist (2020a) compiled a 
list of 66 emerging markets, of which 30 countries, liable for just under 25 % of the 
group’s debt, are in distress or close. CNBC (2020) reports EM currencies falling 
against the US Dollar as asset and commodity values have fallen in the COVID-19 
crisis, and suggest further downward pressure can be expected due to the weakened 
global economic growth outlook. The falling rates act as stabilizers making EM 
investments cheaper for foreign investors, yet also make servicing dollar denominated 
debt more costly for EM borrowers, both public and private. Currency runs are not 
believed to have occurred yet (ibid.). Figure 20 shows an appreciation of EM 
currencies against the US Dollar in 2019Q4, followed by a sharp depreciation due to 
the COVID-19 crisis sparking at the end of 2020Q1 (FRED, 2020). 
y = -3E-06x + 0,1293
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
BBB US Corporate Index Option-Adjusted Spread,
12 May 11 - 12 May 20
 
59 
 
Figure 20: Trade weighted US Dollar index: Emerging Market economies, goods and services 
(FRED, 2020). 
Siimes (2020) emphasizes the importance of considering the long-term funding 
sustainability of the ERP system also during the COVID-19 crisis, as otherwise new 
problems can be expected ahead. The market crash spawned by the crisis has taken a 
considerable chunk out of the ERP companies’ solvency capital buffers and decreased 
the overall pension asset value by approximately €20 bn, down by over 10 % from the 
2019 year-end €215,3 bn total (Kiander, 2020; Mäkinen, 2020). Kiander (2020) 
expects COVID-19 to have permanent impacts on investment markets, including 
increased volatility and the continuation of the low interest rate regime, and on the 
long-term investment risk and return assessment and goals of pension funds. 
The Finnish government has agreed to lower the employers’ contribution rate by 2,6 
%-points until the end of 2020 as a means to aid businesses, with the missing funds 
taken from pension system buffer capital. The resulting loss of contribution income is 
to be repaid with higher employer rates in 2022-2025 (Kautto, 2020b). The 
government is allowing pension companies a longer period to implement any financial 
health improvement programs as required by the crisis. The aim is to avoid forcing 
pension companies to sell their assets at a disadvantageous time. The period is set to 
end 26 March 2023 (STM, 2020). Vihriälä et al. (2020) defend the economic effects 
of the temporary decrease of employer contribution rates, but criticism from the 
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pension system’s perspective has also been voiced. Siimes (2020) and Vaittinen (2020) 
assert the effects come too late and have a limited effect in supporting employment; 
the measure affects all sectors similarly while the pandemic’s effects are not equally 
distributed; the already-decreasing sum of wages paid due to furloughs and decreasing 
employment diminish the effect of the rate cut for businesses; lower contributions must 
be covered with buffer funds; and shortfalls in pension fund capital buffers need to be 
met by realizing investments, causing long-term funding challenges. 
Effects on the real economy cannot yet be fully seen. The pandemic will have global 
supply side effects through e.g. decreasing production and a component shortage due 
to international trade limitations, limiting end product manufacturing. Demand side 
effects include the halt of hotel, restaurant, travel, culture, sports, and trade demand 
(Vaittinen, 2020). The U.S. annualized quarter-on-quarter real GDP for the first 
quarter of 2020 fell by 4,8 %, while personal consumption fell 7,6 %, services 
consumption fell 10,2 %, business fixed investment fell 8,6 %, retail sales fell 8,6 % 
(yahoo! Finance, 2020a). China’s GDP fell 6,8 % year-on-year in 2020Q1 and the 
Eurozone economies’ GDP at a 14,8 % annualized rate. The U.S. economy is believed 
to sink at an annualized rate of 25 % in 2020Q2. Approximately 42 % of job losses are 
projected to remain permanent. However, e.g. Amazon and Walmart have started 
hiring amid the crisis to meet increased demand, leading to approximately three new 
hires for every 10 job losses. COVID-19 is effectively creating a reallocation shock. 
Significant long-term changes are expected in the reallocation of jobs and capital. A 
drawn-out economic recovery from the COVID-19 shock is expected, based on 
creation responses lagging the destruction responses in reallocation shocks by a year 
or more in historic data (Barrero et al., 2020). 
30 % of U.S. 401(k) pension savers have withdrawn on average $6 757,20 from their 
retirement accounts, while another 19 % plan to withdraw funds. Withdrawing pension 
savings has been made cheaper in the CARES Act, aiming to ease acute personal 
financial distress in the COVID-19 crisis. However, withdrawing pension savings 
early may pose personal financial challenges in the future (yahoo! Finance, 2020b). 
The U.S. figures suggest grim figures for Europe also, where anti-pandemic measures 
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and lockdowns were initiated earlier, limiting economic activity for longer. Kiander 
(2020) notes that furloughs shorter than three months are reported as continuing 
employment in Finland, leading to employment figures looking better than the reality 
is. Kiander anticipates up to 300 000 Finnish workers being furloughed in 2020. 
Kilponen (2020) estimates the 2020 employment rate at 68 – 71 %, versus a December 
2019 estimate anticipating 73 %. 
Vihriälä et al. (2020) anticipate production and employment to remain on a lower 
growth path for an extended period and call for policy reforms to support economic 
growth. Public debt is expected to rise from 59,4 % at year-end 2019 up to 90 % of 
GDP by the end of the 2020s in the best scenario. Without policy reforms however, 
debt growth is expected to continue through the 2030s. The public finance imbalances 
are expected to deepen, as driven mainly by population aging. Laid-off workers close 
to retirement age are likely to remain outside the workforce permanently and lay-offs 
in downturns affect low-income workers especially, causing greater and longer-term 
income losses than lay-offs in upturns. Vihriälä et al. (ibid.) urge removing the 
incentives to withdraw from employment before the retirement age, to incentivize 
seeking employment faster than currently, and to target policy actions to those more 
likely to fall out of employment. The Bank of Finland (2020) estimates the Finnish 
GDP to shrink by 4,7 % in 2020 and to grow by 2,7 % and 2,4 % in 2021 and 2022, 
respectively. 
To increase the Finnish economy’s long-term growth potential, Kurronen (2020) 
recommends working to return the level of education in Finland on an upward path, to 
strive for increasing the employment rate, to cut the index-increases of pension 
benefits for the next three years and limiting the benefit period in widowers’ pensions. 
Kurronen (ibid.) urges the removal of the unemployment pathway to retirement 
(eläkeputki), specifically removing the extensions to unemployment benefit periods, 
shortening the maternity/paternity leave benefit period, to put effort into shortening 
periods of unemployment, and to reconsider the salary raises negotiated by labor 
organizations just before the COVID-19 crisis. 
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The Ministry of Finance (MoF) (2020b) supports removing all possible early pathways 
to retirement, including removing special provisions regarding disability pensions, 
dropping the partial old-age pension and removing the unemployment pathway to 
retirement. MoF (ibid.) recommends updating the earnings-related unemployment 
benefit so that a person’s future pension will be deducted by an amount based on the 
number of days on unemployment benefit just prior to retirement. The purpose is to 
increase the incentive to remain in working life until retirement and to increase the 
employment rate among older workers. MoF (ibid.) shows a significant increase in the 
employment rate among older age groups following the removal of unemployment 
benefit “extra days” available to the respective age groups earlier. 
4.3.1 Finnish pension fund performance 
Table 9: Net investment returns and assets (Keva, 2020; TELA, 2020; VER, 2020). 
Table 9 shows the 2019Q1 and 2020Q1 net investment returns for Ilmarinen, Varma, 
the combined figures for the TyEL pension companies Ilmarinen, Varma, Elo and 
Veritas, and the figures for the public sector Keva and VER. Investment assets in € 
millions at year-end 2019 and after 2020Q1 are also displayed. It can be observed that 
the public sector pension companies generated greater negative returns in 2020Q1 than 
the private sector companies. However, table 10 shows the public sector pension 
companies also have a greater exposure to both equities and fixed income as allowed 
by the companies not having solvency requirements. Figure 18 showed the public 
sector pension companies often generate both greater positive and negative returns 
than their private sector counterparts. 
Net investment return 2019Q1 2020Q1 2019Q1 2020Q1 2019Q1 2020Q1 2019Q1 2020Q1 2019Q1 2020Q1
Equities and shares 8,8 % -12,8 % 10,0 % -14,6 % 9,3 % -14,6 % 9,5 % -16,6 % 11,6 % -18,8 %
Listed equities and shares 11,0 % -18,2 % 13,1 % -21,1 % 12,0 % -20,3 % 11,8 % -22,0 % 12,7 % -21,6 %
Fixed-income investments 2,0 % -6,9 % 1,9 % -3,6 % 2,0 % -4,9 % 2,5 % -5,7 % 2,0 % -5,3 %
Real estate investments 1,0 % 1,7 % 0,7 % 1,3 % 1,1 % 1,4 % 0,6 % 1,4 % 4,5 % -7,5 %
Other investments -1,8 % 8,1 % 1,9 % -13,9 % 1,2 % -6,9 % 2,0 % -3,0 % 1,6 % -9,6 %
Investments total 4,6 % -7,5 % 5,1 % -10,0 % 4,9 % -8,9 % 5,5 % -10,4 % 6,6 % -12,6 %
31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020
Investments, € m. 50 528     46 403   48 709     43 597   128 289   116 136 56 166     50 189   20 588     17 864   
ILMARINEN VARMA TyEL COMPANIES VERKEVA
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Table 10: The basic and risk-adjusted investment allocations at market values (TELA, 2020). 
The negative returns from fixed-income investments were due to decreasing 
instrument valuations in lower-grade investments, the decrease of commodity and oil 
prices and the widening of credit risk margins. Central bank measures helped to lower 
credit risk premiums from record high levels by the end of March 2020. From year-
end 2018 to year-end 2019 Ilmarinen had increased the share of BBB-or-lower grade 
debt in its portfolio from 56 % to 66 %, while Varma had decreased its held share from 
54 % to 52 %. At year-end 2019 Ilmarinen had an 11 % investment allocation to China 
and other EMs, while at 2020Q1-end Varma had a 20 % allocation to markets other 
than Finland, Europe, or North America. From year-end 2019 to the end of 2020Q1, 
Ilmarinen’s solvency ratio decreased from 126,6 % to 120,7 %, and Varma’s solvency 
ratio decreased from 130,8 % to 121,6 %. At year-end 2019 Ilmarinen reported its 2,5 
% Value-at-Risk at €2 688 m, or 5,3 % of its investments and 24,9 % of its solvency 
capital, indicating a 2,5 % probability of investment capital decreasing by the indicated 
amount or more in one month. Varma reported its year-end 2019 2,5 % VaR at €1 371 
m, 2,8 % of its investments and 11,8 % of solvency capital. Ilmarinen did not report 
its 2020Q1-end VaR. Varma reported a considerable increase in its VaR, now at 
€3 807 m or 8,7 % of its investments and 48,4 % of solvency capital (Ilmarinen, 2020; 
Varma, 2020;). 
4.4 Exercise on increasing the contribution rate 
The current TyEL contribution rate is 24,4 % and is to remain so until at least 2021. 
Reipas (2019) uses the 24,4 % contribution rate in calculations until 2050 and expects 
the rate to increase to 31,4 % between 2050 – 2085. The expected aging of the 
Basic breakdown
31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020
Other investments 7 % 9 % 18 % 20 % 11 % 13 % 7 % 8 % 5 % 5 %
Real estate investments 13 % 14 % 9 % 11 % 11 % 13 % 6 % 7 % 5 % 5 %
Equities and shares 47 % 44 % 46 % 40 % 47 % 42 % 49 % 46 % 51 % 50 %
Fixed-income investments 34 % 33 % 27 % 30 % 31 % 32 % 38 % 39 % 39 % 41 %
Risk breakdown
31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020 31.12.2019 31.3.2020
Effect of derivatives 5 % 3 % -2 % -1 % 0 % -2 % -1 % -12 % 1 % 1 %
Other investments 10 % 10 % 20 % 20 % 13 % 13 % 7 % 8 % 5 % 5 %
Real estate investments 13 % 14 % 9 % 11 % 11 % 13 % 6 % 7 % 5 % 5 %
Equities and shares 47 % 42 % 46 % 40 % 47 % 42 % 48 % 47 % 51 % 50 %
Fixed-income investments 26 % 31 % 27 % 30 % 29 % 34 % 40 % 51 % 37 % 39 %
ILMARINEN VARMA TyEL COMPANIES KEVA VER
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population in e.g. Väestöliitto (2020) means the higher contribution rate will be paid 
by a smaller employed population relative to the retired. The COVID-19 pandemic 
implies that income and production in the economy are down, which is not an optimal 
premise for raising mandatory payments such as the pension or unemployment 
insurance contributions from the standpoint of lifting the economy back on its feet. 
The Employment Fund (Työllisyysrahasto) (2020) lowered the unemployment 
insurance payment for 2020 by 0,5 %-points due to favorable earlier employment 
developments. It now plans to increase the payment by 0,32 %-points to 2,82 % in 
2021 to off-set some of the funding deficit COVID-19 created. The mandatory TyEL 
contribution rate was cut by 2,6 %-points for employers for the period May-December 
2020, with the deficit to be repaid with a higher employer contribution between 2022-
2025 (Kautto, 2020b). 
This subchapter presents a speculative case where the mandatory TyEL contribution 
rate is increased by one percentage point to 25,4 % until 2050, the year Reipas (2019) 
uses the 24,4 % rate until. The purpose is to study and compare the magnitude that 
private sector pension assets could achieve compared to the basic trend and to compare 
the required contribution rates to achieve the level of assets in 2065 presented in Reipas 
(2019). Should funds increase considerably, it implies the pressure for further and 
significant rate hikes in the future decreases. Another calculation presents the effect of 
having had 1 %-point higher contributions during 2007-2018 and transferring the 
increased income over the realized level directly to funded assets. The effect on the 
level of pension assets from the higher contribution and the resulting changes 
investment returns is considered, as is the increased contribution’s effect on a worker’s 
annual net income. The purpose is to study the level pension assets could have reached 
and infer the usefulness of immediately increasing the contribution rate from the 
pension system’s perspective, and to study the degree a consumer’s net income would 
be affected. 
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4.4.1 Speculation on future contribution rates 
FCP (2020a) assumptions of future real investment returns are applied: 2,5 % p.a. for 
2020-2028 and 3,5 % p.a. from 2029 onwards. In table 11, the basic case presents the 
price-corrected amounts of assets for 2020, 2025, 2030, 2045 and 2065 presented in 
Reipas (2019; Statistics Finland, 2020a). The pension benefits and salary under TyEL 
for the same years are also from Reipas (2019). The annual salary, pension benefits 
and expense figures between 2020-2065 and outside the abovementioned years have 
been calculated using the compound annual growth rate to simulate a steady growth 
leading to the estimated future figures in Reipas (ibid.) (Wikipedia, 2020). 
𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅 = (
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
)
1
𝑛 − 1 
 
Table 11: The basic pattern of pension asset development 2020-2065 versus a speculative case 
with an initially higher contribution rate; 2019 prices (Reipas, 2019; Statistics Finland, 2020a; 
own calculations). 
The contribution rates are fixed at 24,4 % and 25,4 % through 2050 in the basic and 
speculative cases, respectively. The amount of TyEL assets by 2050 is 7,1 % higher 
than in the basic case due to the higher contribution rate and higher investment returns 
on the higher volume of assets. Reipas (2019) predicts the 2065 contribution rate to be 
27,8 %, up considerably from the 24,4 % level used through 2050. Starting from 2051, 
Basic case, € m
Year Assets Salary under TyEL Contribution income Contribution rate Pension benefits Investment returns Real rate of return
2020 132 642 61 953                 15 117                  24,40 % 16 108            3 408                  2,5 %
2025 141 424 66 835                 16 308                  24,40 % 17 912            3 491                  2,5 %
2030 151 737 72 497                 17 689                  24,40 % 19 864            5 237                  3,5 %
2045 209 317 91 614                 22 354                  24,40 % 24 461            7 174                  3,5 %
2050 229 184 96 742                 23 605                  24,40 % 27 089            7 935                  3,5 %
2060 287 594 107 875               29 379                  27,23 % 33 224            9 882                  3,5 %
2065 311 439 113 913               31 668                  27,80 % 36 794            10 732                3,5 %
Speculative case, € m
Year Assets Salary under TyEL Contribution income Contribution rate Pension benefits Investment returns Real rate of return
2020 133 262 61 953                 15 736                  25,40 % 16 108            3 408                  2,5 %
2025 143 605 66 835                 16 976                  25,40 % 17 912            3 542                  2,5 %
2030 155 618 72 497                 18 414                  25,40 % 19 864            5 333                  3,5 %
2045 218 798 91 614                 23 270                  25,40 % 24 461            7 464                  3,5 %
2050 245 434 96 742                 24 572                  25,40 % 27 089            8 410                  3,5 %
2060 295 514 107 875               27 797                  25,77 % 33 224            10 203                3,5 %
2065 311 439 113 913               29 352                  25,77 % 36 794            10 810                3,5 %
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a fixed contribution rate has been calculated for both the basic and speculative case, 
which leads to the level of assets predicted in Reipas (2019) for 2065 through 
contribution income and investment returns on the increasing assets. In the basic case, 
after keeping the contribution level at 24,4 % through 2050, a fixed contribution rate 
to reach the indicated asset volume is 27,23 % in the period 2051-2064, and 27,8 % in 
2065. To reach the same asset volume in the speculative case, where the contribution 
rate is 25,4 % from 2020 onwards, the 2051-2065 contribution rate is 25,77 %. The 
need to further increase the contribution rate in the speculative case is considerably 
diminished. 
Table 12: Basic and speculative case pension assets as a share of GDP (Reipas, 2019; MoF, 
2020a; own calculations). 
Table 12, based on MoF (2020a) GDP estimates, indicates the share of GDP that 
pension assets amount to in the basic and speculative cases. Strictly from the TyEL 
system’s perspective, it is clear that raising the pension contribution rate by 1 %-point 
effective immediately does prepare the TyEL system better in anticipation of future 
challenges. The absolute level of assets increases, the assets as a share of GDP 
increase, and the pressure and needed magnitude for further rate hikes decreases. The 
increased contribution rate itself helps to accumulate more assets faster, while the 
higher volume of assets also accumulates a higher volume of investment returns, 
significantly and further increasing the asset volume. 
4.4.2 Contribution rate-hike effects on past data 
This second part of the exercise is two-fold. First, a look backwards over 2007-2019, 
comparing the realized TyEL assets, payments, returns, and expenses to modified ones 
where the contribution rate is higher by 1 %-point. The difference in contribution 
incomes is wholly funded, as the level of paid benefits stays the same. Second, a look 
at the effect raising the contribution rate has on a worker’s net income over 2007-2018. 
An average annual TyEL contribution and a flat 23 % income tax are deducted from 
Year GDP, € m Basic Speculative
2025 239 390    59,08 % 59,99 %
2030 253 349    59,89 % 61,42 %
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the median income to simulate the effect of taxes and other mandatory payments. The 
share of the contribution payment made by the employee and employer each year in 
the period is calculated from the realized contribution income. The same relation is 
used in the case with the raised contribution rate. TyEL-related data is from FCP 
(2020b), while median income data is from Statistics Finland (2020a). 
Table 13 shows the realized development of pension assets and payments over 2007-
2019 with the annual amounts of contributions transferred to funds and the amounts of 
payments made from funded assets. Also presented is a speculative case where the 
contribution rate has been raised by 1 %-point for each year. The benefits paid annually 
remain the same, so the increased income is funded and is shown as increasing assets, 
which lead to greater investment returns in absolute terms. The column Others includes 
operating expenses, taxes, transfers, payments from the Finnish Employment Fund and 
other expenses. 
Table 13: The realized development of pension assets and payments 2007-2019 versus a 
speculative case with 1 %-point higher contributions (FCP, 2020b; own calculations). 
Realized, € m
Year Assets Contribution Contribution rate Funded income Benefits From funds Investment returns Investment returns, % Others
2007 85 247   9 496           20,9 % 2 000              8 426-   1 000-        4 290                    24-        
2008 73 750   10 339         21,1 % 2 000              9 133-   800-           12 825-                  -15,0 % 122      
2009 83 829   9 968           21,1 % 1 800              10 054- 1 800-        10 115                  13,7 % 51        
2010 92 273   10 261         21,2 % 1 900              10 614- 2 100-        8 853                    10,6 % 57-        
2011 89 368   11 087         21,9 % 1 800              11 275- 1 900-        2 741-                    -3,0 % 23        
2012 96 616   11 825         22,7 % 2 000              11 904- 2 100-        7 370                    8,2 % 43-        
2013 103 743 11 917         22,8 % 1 800              12 815- 2 600-        7 946                    8,2 % 80        
2014 109 589 12 166         23,2 % 2 000              13 484- 3 100-        6 972                    6,7 % 191      
2015 114 011 12 666         23,9 % 2 000              13 979- 2 900-        5 404                    4,9 % 331      
2016 118 659 13 046         24,1 % 2 000              14 429- 3 100-        5 815                    5,1 % 216      
2017 126 152 13 531         24,1 % 2 400              14 961- 3 600-        8 707                    7,3 % 217      
2018 122 963 14 187         24,1 % 2 700              15 367- 3 700-        2 037-                    -1,6 % 28        
2019 136 320 14 971         24,5 % 2 700              16 135- 3 700-        14 524                  11,8 % 3-          
Speculative, € m
Year Assets Contribution Contribution rate Funded income Benefits From funds Investment returns Investment returns, % Others
2007 85 700   9 950           21,9 % 2 453              8 426-   1 000-        4 290                    24-        
2008 74 624   10 828         22,1 % 2 489              9 133-   800-           12 893-                  -15,0 % 122      
2009 85 297   10 441         22,1 % 2 273              10 054- 1 800-        10 235                  13,7 % 51        
2010 94 379   10 745         22,2 % 2 384              10 614- 2 100-        9 008                    10,6 % 57-        
2011 91 917   11 593         22,9 % 2 306              11 275- 1 900-        2 804-                    -3,0 % 23        
2012 99 896   12 346         23,7 % 2 521              11 904- 2 100-        7 580                    8,2 % 43-        
2013 107 816 12 440         23,8 % 2 323              12 815- 2 600-        8 216                    8,2 % 79        
2014 114 460 12 691         24,2 % 2 524              13 484- 3 100-        7 246                    6,7 % 190      
2015 119 653 13 196         24,9 % 2 531              13 979- 2 900-        5 644                    4,9 % 330      
2016 125 132 13 588         25,1 % 2 542              14 429- 3 100-        6 103                    5,1 % 215      
2017 133 660 14 091         25,1 % 2 960              14 961- 3 600-        9 182                    7,3 % 216      
2018 130 938 14 776         25,1 % 3 288              15 367- 3 700-        2 159-                    -1,6 % 26        
2019 145 849 15 583         25,5 % 3 312              16 135- 3 700-        15 466                  11,8 % 5-          
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Table 14 presents the cumulative contribution income, paid benefits, investment 
returns and assets at the end of 2019 in the realized and speculative cases. Assets have 
grown by €9,5 bn more in the speculative case over the period 2007-2019, with most 
of the growth coming from the increased amount of assets funded and a bit more than 
a quarter from the higher volume of investment returns. At the end of 2019, assets as 
a share of GDP are 4 %-points higher in the speculative case with a higher contribution 
rate than in the realized case. In the forward-looking speculative case in chapter 4.4.1., 
a similar asset value of near € 146 bn would be reached only amid 2028 if the 
contribution rate were raised starting from 2020 with the prevailing asset values.  
Table 14: The realized and speculative cumulative contributions, payments, investment returns 
and end-of-period assets for 2007-2019 (FCP, 2020b; own calculations). 
Table 15 presents the realized and speculative TyEL contributions over 2007-2018 and 
the share paid by employees. Omitted are the employer contributions, which are the 
total contributions less the employees’ contributions. Also presented are the realized 
median income, the number of workers who made TyEL contributions in the period, 
the average contribution as the employees’ contributions divided by those paying 
contributions, and the speculative net income, computed as the median income less the 
arbitrary income tax and the average pension contribution. The difference in net 
income is increasing from € 53,12 in 2007 to € 84,33 in 2018, net income being 
annually lower by an average € 67,37 or 0,255 % in the speculative case. The share of 
the contribution paid by the employee and employer are the same as in the realized 
data. The results indicate that raising the contribution rate by 1 %-point over 2007-
2018 has a negligible effect on a median salary earning worker’s net income. Raising 
the contribution rate by 1 %-point over the period means the annual contribution 
payments paid by both the employee and the employer would have been on average 
4,41 % higher. Over a long period, this is a considerable additional expense for 
employers. However, this calculation should not be taken as the absolute truth because 
2007-2019 cumulative, € m
Realized Speculative Difference
Contribution income 155 459   162 267   6 808      
Funded 27 100     33 908     6 808      
Paid benefits -
From funds -
Investment returns 62 391     65 113     2 722      
Assets, end of 2019 136 320   145 849   9 529      
As share of GDP 56,8 % 60,8 %
162 574-                      
32 400-                       
 
69 
 
of the plentiful assumptions made, but rather as an indication of the possible magnitude 
raising the contribution rate could have. 
Table 15: Realized and speculative contribution levels and the effect on net income for a 
median salary earner (FCP, 2020b; Statistics Finland, 2020a; own calculations). 
Realized contributions
Year Contribution rate Contributions, € m By employees Median income, € Tax rate TyEL employed Avg. Contribution, € Net income, €
2007 20,9 % 9 496                       2 031               31 032                    23 % 1 825 447         1 112                           22 782            
2008 21,1 % 10 339                     2 087               32 772                    23 % 1 859 950         1 122                           24 112            
2009 21,1 % 9 968                       2 132               33 816                    23 % 1 799 441         1 185                           24 854            
2010 21,2 % 10 261                     2 284               34 680                    23 % 1 809 171         1 262                           25 441            
2011 21,9 % 11 087                     2 501               35 412                    23 % 1 835 794         1 362                           25 905            
2012 22,7 % 11 825                     2 841               36 312                    23 % 1 832 068         1 550                           26 410            
2013 22,8 % 11 917                     2 858               37 200                    23 % 1 817 632         1 572                           27 072            
2014 23,2 % 12 166                     3 054               37 620                    23 % 1 804 331         1 693                           27 275            
2015 23,9 % 12 666                     3 194               38 040                    23 % 1 803 078         1 772                           27 519            
2016 24,1 % 13 046                     3 297               38 316                    23 % 1 819 304         1 812                           27 691            
2017 24,1 % 13 531                     3 634               38 640                    23 % 1 876 910         1 936                           27 817            
2018 24,1 % 14 187                     3 898               39 336                    23 % 1 916 932         2 033                           28 255            
Speculative contributions
Year Contribution rate Contributions, € m By employees Median income, € Tax rate TyEL employed Avg. Contribution, € Net income, €
2007 21,9 % 9 950                       2 128               31 032                    23 % 1 825 447         1 166                           22 729            
2008 22,1 % 10 828                     2 186               32 772                    23 % 1 859 950         1 175                           24 059            
2009 22,1 % 10 441                     2 233               33 816                    23 % 1 799 441         1 241                           24 798            
2010 22,2 % 10 745                     2 391               34 680                    23 % 1 809 171         1 322                           25 382            
2011 22,9 % 11 593                     2 615               35 412                    23 % 1 835 794         1 424                           25 843            
2012 23,7 % 12 346                     2 966               36 312                    23 % 1 832 068         1 619                           26 341            
2013 23,8 % 12 440                     2 983               37 200                    23 % 1 817 632         1 641                           27 003            
2014 24,2 % 12 691                     3 186               37 620                    23 % 1 804 331         1 766                           27 202            
2015 24,9 % 13 196                     3 328               38 040                    23 % 1 803 078         1 846                           27 445            
2016 25,1 % 13 588                     3 434               38 316                    23 % 1 819 304         1 888                           27 616            
2017 25,1 % 14 091                     3 784               38 640                    23 % 1 876 910         2 016                           27 736            
2018 25,1 % 14 776                     4 059               39 336                    23 % 1 916 932         2 118                           28 171            
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Suggestions of updates 
This thesis has presented a country comparison between the earnings-related pension 
systems in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, and a comprehensive overview of 
the state of the discussion in Finland regarding updating the financial sustainability of 
the system. Details of each pension system have been presented. The level of assets 
and accumulated pension rights, the annual contributions and benefit payments, 
demographic and employment data, and investment returns and allocations have been 
compared. Finally, the directions different entities in Finland would like to see the ERP 
system develop have been visited, and a speculative calculation of the likely effects of 
immediately increasing the contribution rate by 1 %-point was presented. The purpose 
of the research was to find out how to update the Finnish ERP system to improve long-
term financial sustainability while supporting intergenerational equality. This chapter 
will next present recommendations of actions to support the financial sustainability 
from the ERP system’s perspective, and the contributions of this thesis to the social 
discussion. 
First, the employment rate is one of the most vital factors in the long-term financial 
health of the Finnish ERP system. It is lagging behind Denmark and the Netherlands 
and should be increased to improve the long-term financial sustainability of the ERP 
system, but also personal well-being and public finances. The unemployment pathway 
to retirement should be removed to increase employment among older ages and 
enabling more part-time work would help the young and old to enter and remain in 
working life. People with a hindered capacity to work and unable to work full-time 
could also be in part-time employment. Incentives to remain in working life for longer 
could be introduced, e.g. Barr (2013) recommends limiting the dependency of the 
public national and guarantee pensions on accrued occupational pensions. Someone 
who has accrued a small occupational pension and has been away from employment 
for long may see their total pension benefit decrease when entering employment due 
to the public benefits being cut based on increases in the private pension. 
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Second, the forecast demographic development in Finland is leading to enormous 
pressure on the working population to support those on pension. Denmark and the 
Netherlands expect to see the old-age and system dependency ratios increase towards 
the latter half of the century, but by very little compared to Finland. Finland should 
strive to attract work-related immigration better and consider the recommendations in 
Väestöliitto (2020) to implement a meditated population policy in trying to increase 
the total fertility rate. 
Third, the level of contribution income funding and the contribution rate are direct 
ways to influence the long-term sustainability of the Finnish ERP system. Rantala 
(2020) suggests decreasing the level of contribution income funding so that after 
covering the solvency capital requirement, more investment returns would be left to 
control the pressure to increase the contribution rate and a larger share of pension 
benefit payments could be made with contribution income. The aging of the population 
and thus the increasing relation of pensioners to the employed means that eventually 
the contribution income will require more support from the accumulated pension 
assets, which will start diminishing. This in turn leads to lower volumes of investment 
returns, exacerbating the cycle, and likely the contribution rate would have to be raised 
considerably at a future date. The positive side is, especially amid the COVID-19 
pandemic, that the contribution rate would not be raised for some time and the 
competitiveness of the Finnish economy would not be hurt further. 
Strictly from the ERP system’s perspective, it seems a sounder solution to consider 
increasing the contribution rate by e.g. 1 %-point as was speculated in chapter 4.4 – if 
not now, then in the near future. The direct positive effect on pension assets is 
significant, and it is supported by the increasing volume of investment returns to a 
greater pool of assets. The procedure would better uphold the intergenerational 
equality of the ERP system, as growing the pool of assets begins at a time of healthier 
old-age and system dependency ratios. However, the pension expenses for both 
employers and employees would have been on average 4,41 % higher annually over 
2007-2019 with a 1 %-point higher contribution rate, which means raising the 
contribution rate brings not-insignificant added costs to employers. Hence, the time to 
 
72 
 
raise the contribution rate is probably not before the broader economy has recovered 
from COVID-19, yet raising the rate well before 2050 would be beneficial for the 
financial sustainability of the ERP system and for upholding intergenerational 
equality. The changes in the net income for a median salary-earning worker are 
negligible, meaning little changes in current consumption could be expected. 
Fourth, the pension schemes in Denmark and the Netherlands are most often not 
company specific like in Finland but organized at a sectoral or industry level. This 
pooling of pension agreements helps bring down the administrative costs by creating 
economies of scale and thus is worth considering in Finland also. Better Finance 
(2019) asserts that a 0,1 %-point drop in expenses eases the pressure to increase 
contribution rates by 3 %-points over a 25-year medium term. 
Fifth, the solvency capital requirements on the Finnish TyEL funds aim to limit risk-
taking and are almost too efficient. Aaltonen et al. (2017) and Vaittinen (2019) assert 
a 1 %-point’s change in investment returns causes a 2 %-point change in the pressure 
to increase the contribution rate. The Danish first-pillar ATP does not fall under 
solvency capital requirements similarly to Finnish Keva and VER, and has 
outperformed its private sector counterparts consistently, similarly to the public and 
private sector pension funds in Finland. This is not to support removing the solvency 
capital requirement but limiting it to allow the Finnish private sector funds more risk-
taking. The fixed required rate of return and fund-increasing supplementary factor 
together are high in the prevailing low-interest rate regime and are not attainable with 
low-risk instruments, while high-risk instruments bind more solvency capital. The 
allowed level of risk-taking and return requirements are at odds. The funded assets 
must be topped up with solvency capital during weak returns, which further 
undermines the pension fund’s ability to bear risk. The present value of pension 
liabilities has increased due to the low interest rates, effectively making providing 
pension benefits more expensive. The fixed discount rate should be made a market-
based rate, and the solvency capital requirement be made counter-cyclical, so that the 
capital requirement in downturns is lower than in upturns. The parameters used in 
computing the solvency capital requirement should also be updated regularly 
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according to the market situation. The level of investment expertise in the management 
boards of the TyEL institutions should also be increased. 
Sixth, a pension ceiling similar to that in the Netherlands should be implemented. This 
means a maximum level of annual income insurable in the statutory pension system. 
Income above this maximum threshold could be privately pension insured if so desired 
by the individual but is not required. The contributions paid by high-earning 
participants help to pay out current pension benefits, but also create an additional 
burden on future generations having to pay out the high accrued benefits of high-
earning participants. This could limit the development of extremely high pension 
benefits and thus ease the future funding balance of the ERP system when the relation 
of pensioners to the employed increases. 
This thesis produced tangible recommendations on improving the financial 
sustainability of the Finnish ERP system and pooled together current lines of societal 
discussion on the matter from Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The thesis also 
went against the currant by speculating on the idea of increasing the pension 
contribution rate sooner rather than later. The recommendations made in this chapter 
include ones that require more significant cooperation by lawmakers and social 
partners, but others are relatively easily adoptable. Although raising the contribution 
rate in the very near future could significantly aid the financial sustainability of the 
ERP system, the increasing costs especially for employers might decrease the 
willingness to employ workers. However, if the contribution rate was increased now 
rather than later, the hike could be much less steep than what is projected inevitable in 
the future and would better uphold the intergenerational equality of the ERP system. 
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5.2 Limitations and scope for further research 
The primary limitation is inherent in the topic – Discussion on improvements to the 
financial sustainability of the Finnish earnings-related pension system. The ERP 
system is a complex institution, and the funding side of it is such also alone. Technical 
details of capital requirements and regulations could have been opened up more, yet 
their inclusion would have made the thesis overtly technical and possibly taken away 
from the actual topic. The speculative exercise on increasing the contribution rate 
performed in chapter 4.4 is computed based on the most recent and official numbers 
realized in the pension system and on forecasts by the Finnish Centre for Pensions, but 
also on personal assumptions and should be considered a policy recommendation 
without comprehensive further calculations. It is hard to separate the investment 
procedures and returns of a pension system from its incomes and expenses, pensions 
included, but limiting the scope in this manner could be beneficial for the 
informativeness and thoroughness of future research. 
The validity of the study is built upon using a comprehensive set of current private and 
public sector produced studies and data. The numbers are predominantly from official 
public institutions or associations of pension insurers, while the referenced studies are 
from both the aforementioned, non-governmental organizations, university studies and 
private think-tanks and consultancies. In most cases, several authors cite similar 
information as facts and recommendations, while the numbers’ data sources have been 
compared to each other to find any discrepancies. The credibility of different data 
sources and the validity of creating the exercise on increasing the contribution rate 
have also been discussed with the thesis supervisor. 
Further research should be conducted on the societal costs of increasing the pension 
contribution rate. What is the type and magnitude of reactions from employers if the 
contribution rate was increased, and what is the type and magnitude of change in 
consumer behavior following a decrease in the net income are both crucial questions. 
In case the anticipated reactions are negligible, it seems raising the contribution rate 
would do the pension system well, but if the reactions are significant and negative, 
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leading to the broader economy suffering, the pension system could suffer due to 
falling employment and income levels. Were the contribution rate to be raised sooner 
than later, an appropriate timeline should be researched – the best time to increase 
payments most likely is not amid the COVID-19 pandemic and its repercussions. An 
appropriate level for the pension ceiling should also be researched, so the ceiling would 
meaningfully close out above-maximum shares of incomes, while still allowing the 
accrual of a stable statutory pension that reflects the person’s working life income. 
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